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ABSTRACT
Typically, students of foreign policy have viewed the decision-
making process from perspectives that downplay, if not ignore, societal
influence. Canadian scholar Patrick Stuart Robinson has gone against
this trend, asserting that foreign policy, properly understood, is in
fact rooted in society. According to Robinson, the political process is
inherently a social activity, and as such, imposes certain constraints
on decision-makers. He asserts that decision-makers, like all members of
society, have a role to play. Indeed, as the symbolic representatives of
their constituency, these individuals have a particularly significant
position within society -- they are at the helm of the ongoing process
of affirming its values and rules. Like everyone else, they too are
aware of, what is expected of them according to their role. However,
because of their status, and because of the importance of what they do,
decision-makers are especially burdened by societal expectations. Their
choices cannot simply be made according to personal preferences; rather,
they must be made against the backdrop of their leadership position and
its attendant obligations to society. Importantly, as Robinson notes,
the "political fortunes [of decision-makers] -- even their survival --
depend to a great extent on how they are popularly perceived to have
discharged [their] ... responsibility." As a result, considerations of
role and appropriateness are often pivotal to the policy-making process.
This thesis, a case study of the Canadian response to the Cuban
missile crisis, lends credence to Robinson's argument. Specifically, it
shows that considerations of role, responsibility, and appropriateness
were highly relevant to the Diefenbaker government in the formulation of
Canadian policy. Moreover, this thesis dispels the popular notion that
Canada's reaction to the crisis can be explained solely by reference to
Prime Minister Diefenbaker's propensity for indecision, his personal
antipathy for President Kennedy, or his strong Canadian nationalism.
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INTRODUCTION
1. PURPOSE 01' TBB !'DSIS
Former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson once remarked
that foreign policy ~ ... is merely domestic policy with its hat
on .•• Canada's foreign policy, so far as it is Canadian policy at all,
is, in fact, largely the consequence of domestic factors •.. "l If one
concedes that domestic factors have a role in shaping Canada's external
relations, the question remains as to how and why they do. Typically,
students of Canadian foreign policy have viewed policy-making from a
perspective which downplays, if not ignores, societal influence. 2 Such
an interpretation, known as ~statism," suggests that
.•. foreign policy making, with limited exception, remains the
almost exclusive preserve of a handful of politicians,
bureaucrats, and ex-officio players who, by the rules of
parliamentary procedure and by custom and tradition, are well
insulated from the demands of civil society.3
In contrast to statism, this thesis explores the centrality of
societal influence on Canadian external relations. It challenges the
argument that the state is autonomous from society, and proposes instead
that foreign policy, properly understood, is rooted in society. To
develop this proposition, the thesis examines as a case study Canada's
1 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed.
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1989), 19.
2 David Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and
Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1989), 9.
3 Ibid. Goldberg is paraphrasing Kim Richard Nossal, who suggests that " .•• the
orthodoxy of domestication notwithstanding, the state enjoys •.. relative
autonomy vis a vis civil society." According to Nossal, "only at the outer
limits of a broad band of acceptable behaviour will the state's actions not
diverge from societal preferences." See Kim Richard Nossal, "Analyzing the
Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy," International Journal 39, no. 1 (Winter
1983-84), 22. Works espousing a statist interpretation of Canadian politics
include S.D. Clark, "Canada and the American Value System," in Richard Schultz,
Orest M. Khrulak and Sidney I. Pobihushchy, eds., The Canadian Political
Process: A Reader. Revised Edition (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973),
61-8; Robert Presthus, "Interest Groups and the Canadian Parliament: Activity,
Interest, Legitimacy, and Influence," Canadian Journal of Political Science IV,
no. 4 (December 1971), 444-60; Robert Presthus, "Interest Group Lobbying: Canada
and the United States," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, no. 413 (1974b), 44-57; Nossal, The Politics, passim; Nossal,
"Analyzing the Domestic Sources," 1-22.
2reaction to the events of October 1962. The Cuban missile crisis is
selected because it was an event in Canadian history where societal
impact on external policy was particularly visible, yet which has been
explained, in large part, according to the statist tradition.
2. SOCIETY, STATZ, AND CANADIAN JIORBIGH POLICY .ANALYSIS
To date, only a handful of Canadian foreign policy analysts have
questioned prevailing assumptions concerning society and its relation to
the state. Writing the foreword to Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon's book on
interest groups in Canada, scholar Don Munton lamented that
••• a good deal is known about the predilections of prime
ministers, past and present, and about the workings and views of
officialdom in the Department of External Affairs. However, less
is known about the factors within the Canadian society, economy,
and polity which influence foreign policies, and how such
influence is exerted. Beyond a lingering, fairly common - and
almost certainly incorrect - assumption that these factors do not
matter much, there is little general understanding of the subject.~
Within the literature that explores the impact of society on
Canadian foreign policy, there are basically two theoretical approaches.
The preponderance of existing work is premised on an interpretation of
influence which arises mainly out of the overt participation of societal
groups in the decision-making process. Examples of this work include
studies by Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, David Taras, and David Goldberg
which examine interest groups and their impact on foreign policy,5 and
pieces by Harald von Riekhoff, John Kirton, and Peyton Lyon which focus
on the collegial decision-making process under Prime Minister Pierre
Elliott Trudeau. 6 Less attention has been devoted to the study of
4 Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian
Foreign Policy (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985),
vii.
5 Ibid; David Goldberg and David Taras, ~Influencing Canada's Middle East
Policy: The Domestic Battleground," in David Goldberg and David Taras, eds., Tbe
Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1989), 3-13; and Goldberg, Foreign Policy, 9. See also
Presthus, "Interest Groups," 44-60.
6 Harald von Riekhoff, "The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Foreign Policy,"
International Journal XXXIII, no. 2 (Spring 1978), 267-86; John Kirton, "Foreign
?
3Canadian society in general and its more subtle impact on foreign
policy. Denis Stairs, writing in 1977, provided a broad theoretical
framework for studying the various aspects of domestic influence. For
Stairs, society's role in parameter-setting was of particular
importance:
••• The pressure of constituent opinions - or at least what are
perceived as constituent opinions - will clearly limit a policy-
maker's practical freedom of maneuver. This can happen, moreover,
even when the relevant opinions are not expressly articulated.?
Similarly, Michael Tucker's text on Canadian foreign policy
suggested that societal impact " ... has been determined largely by the
nature of political responses of government to it, and this has been one
for the most part of government's sense of the 'mood' of the people, be
it sectional or national. Hs Most recently, Robert Cox has gone so far as
to suggest that the disposition of powers like Canada to play a middle
power role in the world is rooted fundamentally in the
~ .•. characteristics, values and interests of the state ... and the civil
society within which it is embedded.,,9
Building upon work by Stairs and others, this thesis will examine
the tumultuous events of the Cuban Missile Crisis to show that society
does indeed play a significant role in the shaping of Canadian foreign
policy.
Policy Decision-Making in the Trudeau Government: Promise and Perforomance,"
International Journal XXXIII, no. 2 (Spring 1978), 287-311; and Peyton Lyon,
"The Trudeau Doctrine," International Journal XXVI, no. 1 (Winter 1970-71), 19-
43. Other studies premised on the same view of societal impact include Walter
Soderlund and Ronald Wagenberg, "The Editor and External Affairs: The 1972 and
1974 Election Campaigns," International Journal XXXI, no. 2 (Spring 1976), 244-
54# and Denis Stairs, "The Press and Foreign Policy in Canada," International
Journal XXXI, no. 2 (Spring 1976), 223-43.
7 Denis Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the
'Domestication' of Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal XXXIII, no. 1
(Winter 1977-78), 132. Stairs envisaged four possibilities for domestic (non-
governmental) influence: agenda-setting, parameter-setting, policy-setting, and
administration setting. Italics in original.
S Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Cont~orary Issues and Themes
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980), 42.
9 David Black and Heather Smith, "Notable Exceptions? New and Arrested
Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," Canadian Journal of Political
Studies XXVI, no. 4 (December 1993), 765.
4CBAPTBR ONE: TDORBTICAL DIMENSIONS
1. SOCIETY
Before discussing the theoretical framework of the thesis, it is
necessary to briefly examine one of its key concepts society. In the
most general of terms, a society is an " ..• autonomous group of people
engaged in a broad range of cooperative activities."l Yet, a society is
much more involved than such a simple definition would suggest. This
complexity is best illustrated by asking "What differentiates one
society from another?" In part, the answer to this question is found in
the physical characteristics of the society in question its
geography, population, genetic makeup, age, and its production and
consumption of material goods. In part, too, the answer lies in the
normative characteristics of the society -- its values, rules, roles,
and expectations. 2 It is the latter, normative dimension of a society
which is of particular concern for this thesis, and which requires
further elaboration.
Every human society, whatever its physical makeup, is a normative
order, an ever-changing system of (sometimes conflicting) values and
rules of conduct. 3 As such, each society has a moral/ideological
foundation which comprises its core beliefs and ideals. Structured
around this foundation of values is a framework of formal and informal
1 Autonomy is key to the definition of a society -- it allows one to
differentiate between a society and its sub-units. Basically, the distinction
is about authority, or sovereignty. Thus, at a conceptual level, the state and
society are intertwined. Gerhard Lenski and Jean Lenski, Human Societies: An
Introduction to Macrosociology, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1982), 8. See Nick Mansfield, Introductory Sociology: Canadian Perspectives
(Toronto: Collier Macmillan canada Inc., 1982), 82-84; Michael Oakeshott, "The
Vocabulary of a Modern European State," Political Studies XXIII, no. 2 (1975),
337.
2 David Frisby and Derek Sayer, Society (New York: Tavistock Publications,
1986), 27-28, 42-51, 69, 96-105, 120 and 123. See also Lenski and Lenski, Human
Societies, 23 and 34-53.
3 Society is always in a state of flux, changing sometimes incrementally,
sometimes radically. Because of this, some norms and values in a society may
actually be incompatible with each other. Further, various groups within society
may also have differing opinions, values, and nODmS -- in short, society is not
a monolithic entity. Mansfield, Introductory Sociology, 349-367.
5rules according to which relations with others are conducted and judged.
These rules, or norms, define what behaviour is acceptable or
appropriate for whom under what circumstances. 4 Because of norms, an
individual socialized into a particular society will have certain
expectations of how a good boy should behave, for example, or how a
responsible adult should act, or even how a worthy government should
lead the country. Similarly, each individual is aware of what behaviour
is considered appropriate for himself/herself according to his/her role
in society.
Importantly, a society is not only about norms; it is also about
their enforcement rules can serve no purpose without general
compliance. Therefore, every society has a wide array of positive and
negative sanctions which are used by its members to motivate aberrant
individuals to behave. These social sticks and carrots range ~ ... all the
way from a simple word of encouragement to a large monetary prize or
appointment to an important office, from a fleeting frown on someone's
face to the death penalty."s However, external stimuli can only go so
far in motivating individual action; as each person is ultimately
responsible for his/her own behaviour, self-regulation is a crucial
aspect of social control. Accordingly, every society goes to great
lengths to ensure that all of its members internalize its values and
rules of conduct. Through the process of socialization, each person is
trained to experience feelings such as guilt, obligation, or pride.
These feelings are perhaps a society's most effective tool in securing
compliance to its norms. 6
4 Lenski and Lenski, Human Societies, 33.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. It must be noted, however, that all unpleasant social sanctions
notwithstanding, people still occasionally go against rules and values of a
society. In part, this may be due to conflicts in the normative fabric of that
society. For example, the issue of abortion is highly contentious because it
places important values in irreconcilable conflict - the right to life, and the
right of personal choice.
6Having very briefly outlined the normative dimension of society
(hereinafter referred to as society) and its impact on the individual,
the discussion will now turn to how society affects decision-makers in
the political process.
2.1 POLI'!ICS, ROLE, CHOICE, AND '!BB LOGIC 01' APPROPRIATBRBSS
As outlined in the introduction, this thesis proposes to examine
the effect of society on the Canadian government's response to the Cuban
Missile Crisis. To do so, it will utilize a theoretical framework that
has recently been developed by Patrick Stuart Robinson in critical
response to the tendency of existing international relations literature
to exclude " ••. political context and content from its narrow procedural
analysis of foreign policy making."7 Crucial to Robinson's perspective
is his characterization of politics. Building on the work of James March
and Johan Olsen, Robinson emphasizes that politics is, at base, " •.. the
discussion/engagement of a normative social order."8 If, by definition,
politics is inherently a social exercise, how should this affect the
analysis of the foreign policy decision-making process? Robinson
suggests that political leaders must be viewed in the context of
society.9 He contends that decision-makers, like all members of a
society, have a role to play. Indeed, as the symbolic representatives of
their constituency, these individuals have a particularly significant
position within society -- they are at the helm of the ongoing process
7 P. Stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning, and the Institutional context of Foreign
Policy Decision-Making," International Journal XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 425.
See also P. Stuart Robinson, "Hobson's Choice: The Politics of International
Crisis Escalation," (Ph.D. Thesis, University of British Colombia, November
1991) •
8 P. Stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning," 433. See James March, and Johan Olsen,
Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free
Press, 1989); James March and Johan Olsen (eds.), Ambiguity and Choice in
Organizations, 2nd ed. (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1987). See also Oakeshott,
"The Vocabulary," 337, 412.
9 Robinson castigates existing international relations theory for treating the
political leader as " ... though he were an autonomous utility-seeking decision-
maker." P. Stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning," 413.
7of defining and affirming its values and rules. lo Like everyone else,
they too are aware of what is expected of them according to their role.
However, because of their status and the importance of what they do,
decision-makers are especially burdened by societal expectations. Their
choices cannot simply be made according to personal preferences;ll
rather, they must be made against the backdrop of their leadership
position and its attendant obligations to society. 12 Importantly, as
Robinson notes, the ~ .•.political fortunes [of decision-makers] -- even
their survival -- depend to a great extent on how they are popularly
perceived to have discharged [their] .•. responsibility."13
As a result, policy-makers often make their decisions more
according to appropriateness than instrumental consequentiality -- it is
not what is specifically done (or even whether it is successful.)14 that
is important so much as that the means and ends are considered to be
fitting. March and Olsen, in discussing this phenomenon, suggest that
...political institutions and the individuals in them need to
communicate to their observers that the decisions they make are
legitimate •.. Legi timacy is established by showing that the
decisions accomplish appropriate objectives or by showing that
they are made in appropriate ways.lS
Ie P. Stuart Robinson, ~Hobson's Choice," 40. James March and Johan Olsen,
~Organizational Choice Under Ambiguity," in March and Olsen, eds., Ambiguity and
Choice in Organizations, 11. See also March and Olsen, Rediscovering
Institutions, 49.
11 The argument may be made that the values and preferences of decision-makers
do not differ considerably from the constituency they represent. After all, they
have " ... been subject to the same social and cultural factors •.•• " Bernard
Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Wisconsin: Little, Brown and
Company, 1973), 199.
12 P. Stuart Robinson, "Hobson's Choice," 148; March and Olsen, ~Organizational
Choice," 15; Denis Stairs, ~Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on
the 'Domestication' of Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal XXXIII,
no. 1 (Winter 1977-78), 140.
13 P. Stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning," 417.
14 For example, when Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien raises the question
of human rights in his discussions with dignitaries from the People's Republic
of China, he does not really expect any substantive results. Thus, his behaviour
cannot be justified on a purely instrumental basis. It is more easily explained
with reference to notion of appropriateness - 'human rights' are important to
Canadians, and consequently it is expected that their leader champion them - if
only at a symbolic level. See March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, 50,
160. See also P. Stuart Robinson, "Hobson's Choice," 300.
15 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, 49.
8In essence, their every choice must be justifiable -- if not to
themselves,16 then at least to their constituency.l? Fundamentally, it is
this notion of legitimacy which forms the nexus between the individual
decision-maker and the rest of society, and is thus the means by which
social values and expectations find purchase in the foreign policy
process.
2.2 TBBORETICAL APPLICABILITY
As Kim Richard Nossal notes in his influential text on Canadian
foreign policy, there are myriad, ever-fluctuating factors which
influence state behaviour. As a result, it is highly improbable that
~ ... one source or determinant is likely to manifest itself consistently
as the single explanation of a particular decision or set of decisions
in foreign policy.HIB Naturally, society's impact on the foreign policy
process is no exception to this rule. It must be remembered that
political leaders are not mindless conduits, formulating every external
policy decision according to the dictates of society. However, that
said, there are situations where the decision-making process is best
explained by using the analytical concepts of role, legitimacy, and the
"logic of appropriateness. HI9
Fundamentally, societal impact on a foreign policy decision is
linked to the political saliency of the issues involved. The more
important an issue to society, the more likely decision-makers are
constrained by societal expectations. Governments have considerable
16 " ••• The force that moves the typical official is a personal ambition to do
something that seems important to him, and to do it well ..•• The official is not
a 'mindless bureaucrat' but a knowledgeable person with some convictions about
the value and appropriateness of particular courses of action." Cohen, B., The
Public's I~act on Foreign Policy (Wisconsin: Little, Brown and Company, 1973),
201.
17 One analyst makes the wry observation: "self-consciousness of role has always
linked politics and the theatre." Leo Bogart, Silent Politics: Polls and the
Awareness of Public qpinion (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 140.
18 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd edt
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1989), 12. Italics in original.
19 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, 160.
9latitude when dealing with foreign policy issues which are of little
impact domestically, or which are of little concern domestically.
However, if an issue is of particular societal significance -- for
symbolic or other less emotive reasons -- policy-makers may find their
range of socially acceptable choices to be quite limited. Whether this
really affects the decision-making process, however, is dependent upon
~the nature and circumstances of the state."20
Indeed, the extent to which the logic of appropriateness is
capable of explaining decision-making behaviour is linked to each
particular government's need and desire to legitimate its actions. 21 A
government's stability (real or perceived) and sensitivity to criticism
(actual or possible) are critical elements in determining the extent to
which choices are made and justified according to the normative dictates
of society.22 Relevant factors include the personalities of individual
decision-makers, their perceptions of the issues, and the nature and
strength of political opposition. In some instances, however, government
decisions must at least be minimally defended and legitimized, no matter
what the nature and circumstances of the state. This is certainly the
case with international crises. 23
In an international crisis, a society faces a significant threat
to its values, or even to its very existence. The response of the state,
be it to wage war or to back down and suffer the consequences, must be
defended or legitimized in one form or another. Such justification, of
2C P. Stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning," 427.
21 This, of course, is linked to the nature of action to be taken. The use of
force, for example, constitutes an indisputably political act " ••. which to some
extent must be defended and legitimized." P. Stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning,"
426.
22 According to P. Stuart Robinson, " political stability is clearly important,
for the commitments of leaders will be more binding if their hold on power is so
tenuous that unfulfilled promises might bring about their downfall." Ibid., 428.
23 A crisis is defined as a "change in [the state's] .•• external or internal
environment, which generates a threat to basic values, with a s~ultaneous or
subsequent high probability of involvement in military hostilities, and the
awareness of a finite time for their response to the external value threat."
Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 43-44.
10
course, is made with reference to the values and expectations of
society. In doing so, policy-makers are implicitly either reaffirming or
redefining the normative fabric of their collectivity. Robinson goes so
far as to suggest that crises are instances par excellence of societal
impact on foreign policy making because they " ..• exhibit most acutely
the logic of collective action and its collective understanding."
Indeed, they are major "formative [events] in the evolution" of a
society.24
For Canada, the Cuban missile crisis was certainly one such
formative event. Using Robinson's framework to highlight the link
between the Diefenbaker government's actions and society, the thesis
will show that Canada's reaction cannot be properly understood without
reference to the important societal issues engaged by the crisis. Before
this argument is made, however, discussion will turn to a critical
examination of the "conventional wisdom" concerning the Canadian
response to the events of October 1962.
24 P. Stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning," 423.
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CHAPTER TWO: EXISTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DIEFENBARER GOVERNMENT'S
RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962
During the past five decades, international relations have been
dominated by the East-West conflict that rose out of the ashes of World
War II. Every state, large or small, found its foreign policy greatly
affected by what eventually came to be known as the 'Cold War.' At one
level, the Cold War was merely a struggle between two technologically
advanced superpowers, each vying for world ascendancy. At another, more
profound level, the Cold War was about ideology; it pitted the beliefs
and values of the West against those of the East. Quite simply, it was
the most encompassing conflict the world has yet to see. Yet ironically,
it was a war that could not logically be fought in any tradi tional
sense. Indeed, the advent of nuclear weapons introduced a critical
dynamic into the conflict -- the prospect of world annihilation. As a
consequence, the Cold War, while ideologically intense, was remarkably
subdued, limited mainly to wars of proxy and flourishes of rhetoric.
Direct confrontation between the two major protagonists, the United
States and the Soviet Union, was by and large avoided. A near exception
to this pattern was the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 -- a
handful of days during which the world tottered over the abyss of
nuclear armageddon.
Canada was a minor player in this head-to-head conflict between
superpowers. Yet, its response to the events that October has received
considerable attention. Why did Canada delay in alerting its military
forces? Why did the Diefenbaker government hesitate in offering support
for the American quarantine? For the most part, the existing literature
on the subject has provided rather narrow responses to these questions,
laying the blame for alleged Canadian waffling and indecision squarely
at the feet of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. 1 While such a
1 Peter Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland
and stewart Ltd., 1963), 333-40.
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Diefenbaker-centred explanation is not without basis, its narrow focus
warrants a critical re-evaluation -- the task of this thesis. The first
section of this chapter will examine the prevailing interpretations of
the crisis, as derived from works by Peter Newman, Patrick Nicholson,
Peyton Lyon, and Knowlton Nash. The remainder of the chapter will
address revisionist explanations of the crisis and their contribution to
a more complete understanding of events, and will discuss how the thesis
plans to build upon their ideas to go beyond the narrow focus of the
conventional wisdom.
1. DIEFENBAKER-CENTRED INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CANADIAN RESPONSE TO THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
1.1 THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: PART ONE
A fundamental tenet of the conventional wisdom finds basis in
Prime Minister Diefenbaker's seemingly chronic inability to make
decisions of any political magnitude. 2 Influential journalists such as
Peter Newman and Patrick Nicholson and former Cabinet colleagues such as
Douglas Harkness, Pierre Sevigny and Gordon Churchill, have all made the
argument that the major, if not only, reason for the delay in alerting
Canadian forces and in publicly supporting US President John Kennedy's
stand lay in Diefenbaker's propensity, now infamous, for indecision. 3
The Prime Minister, according to his detractors, simply could not make
tough choices. The Cuban missile crisis, they say, was just another
example of this.
Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered
(Toronto: The Canadian Institute of strategic Studies, 1993), 34. According to
Haydon, "Diefenbaker's inherent indecisiveness ... [is a] frequent theme in many
later assessments and a cornerstone of the conventional prevailing wisdom."
3 Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs: 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1968), 37. See also Newman, Renegade in Power, 333-40; Patrick Nicholson,
Vision and Indecision (Don Mills: Longman's Canada Ltd., 1968), 145-178; Pierre
Sevigny, This Game of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), 253,
257; Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, 176-177.
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To be truthful, Diefenbaker, like any other poli tician, did not
like being forced to decide thorny issues. In answering his critics, he
would find solace in the words of his idol Sir John A. Macdonald
~precipitous action does not always result in wise decisions."4 At base,
the Prime Minister's reluctance to make politically difficult decisions
stemmed from the fact that he " .•. believed that governments defeat
themselves by their own mistakes and he wanted to keep these self-
inflicted wounds to a minimum. "5 Thus, when faced with a particularly
divisive and problematic dilemma, he would frequently put it off, with
the hope that an acceptable solution would be more readily found at a
later time. 6 In this, it should be noted, Diefenbaker had much in common
with Canada's longest serving, and perhaps most politically astute Prime
Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, whose credo was "postpone,
postpone, abstain."
Of course, Prime Minister Diefenbaker was not always loath to make
up his mind. He acted quite precipitously when he approved the North
American Air Defence (NORAD) agreement on July 24, 1957, having been
~stampeded"7 into accepting it by Chief of Defence Staff General Charles
FOUlkes. The agreement, which united Canadian and American forces in the
aerial defence of North America, would have enormous repercussions for
the future. As the implications of NORAD for Canadian sovereignty made
themselves more clear with the passing of time, the Prime Minister may
very well have regretted his haste, though he would not admit it. 8
4 Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto:
Macfarlane and Ross, 1995), 442.
5 Patrick Kyba, Alvin: A Biography of the Honourable Alvin Hamilton, P.C.
(Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1989), 205.
6 John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada's Department of External Affairs:
Volume 2 Coming of Age, 1946-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1995), 135; H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign
Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 318.
7 Minutes, House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, 1963, 510. Cited in
Smith, Rogue Tory, 264-265.
6 Defending his decision to approve NORAD without even going to Cabinet,
Diefenbaker staked his reputation on the fact that NORAD entailed no loss of
sovereignty for Canada, and that extensive consultation would occur in the case
of an emergency. Smith, Rogue Tory, 292-295; John Diefenbaker, One Canada:
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According to Nicholson, Newman, et al., Diefenbaker was patently
unable to handle any major issues at all by the time of the Cuban
crisis. In essence, he lacked the political confidence to act
decisively. The root of the problem, these authors suggest, can be
traced all the way back to the horrendously difficult decision to scrap
the Avro Arrow in 1959. Writing for Maclean's, Blair Fraser commented on
the choice to terminate the fighter program:
The plain truth is, nobody thought the government would have the
courage to make such a painful decision. The fact that the
decision was right didn't carry enough weight. It meant an early
end to twenty thousand jobs, most of them in the very heartland of
the Conservative Party. It went against the emotional urges of all
Canadian air force men, and of most air-force veterans. It
disappointed a big Canadian industry with many big Conservative
shareholders. In short, it was political poison, of a kind to
scare any politician out of a year's growth."
Unfortunately for the Progressive Conservative government, the
cancellation of the Arrow, justifiable as it may have been, was not well
received by Central Canada. The backlash was immediate and forceful, and
came as a real shock to Diefenbaker. He had been caught in a no-win
situation, and, according to Postmaster General William Hamilton, the
Prime Minister desperately wanted to " ... avoid any such issue in the
future. n10 From that point on, the Progressive Conservatives, with their
huge parliamentary majority, governed as if they were a minority
government. Political caution was the watchword of the day, and
Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker - The Tumultuous Years
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977), 25.
9 Smith, Rogue Tory, 316. Smith is quoting Blair Fraser, who wrote "Backstage at
Ottawa: What Led Canada to Junk the Arrow," in Maclean's (October, 25, 1958).
10 Peter Stursberg, Diefenbaker: Leadership Lost 1962-1967 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1976), xii. With the decision to scrap the Arrow, the
Diefenbaker government was criticized for not only destroying up to 14,000 jobs,
but for effectively ending Canada's ability to independently supply itself with
state-of-the-art aviation weaponry. If it had decided to continue the program,
however, it would have been subject to the charge that it bought the
monumentally expensive interceptors (which were of dubious strategic utility,
given the shift to intercontinental missiles) out of partisan, electoral
opportunism. For an excellent account of the decision to terminate the Arrow,
see Russell Isinger, The AVRO Canada CF-l05 Arrow Programme: Decisions and
Determinants (M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1997).
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Diefenbaker became even more determined to act only when there was a
consensus in Cabinet. ll
The electoral rebuff of the 1962 elections dealt another massive
blow to Diefenbaker's confidence, especially when viewed in conjunction
with the death of his close friend and confidant Senator William
Brunt. 12 The Prime Minister's mental trauma was further compounded by a
bone fracture suffered on July 21, and he \\ ... was sent to bed by his
doctors -- who may have been prescribing for low spirits as much as for
a broken ankle .,,13 During a period of several weeks, Diefenbaker fell
into a deep depression, wavering on the brink of breakdown. 14
Physically, he would eventually recuperate by the end of the summer, but
it would take him much longer to recover his political self-assurance. 15
When the Cuban missile crisis broke on October 22, the Canadian
government, like most others, was caught relatively unprepared. 16
Following President Kennedy's broadcast and Prime Minister Diefenbaker's
speech in the House of Commons, Canadian Defence Minister Douglas
Harkness was made aware that that the US military had been placed on
Defence Condition Three (DefCon 3) .17 He immediately approached the
11 Stursberg, Diefenbaker, X11; Kyba, Alvin, 201; John Hilliker and Donald
Barry, "Choice and Strategy in Canadian Foreign Policy: Lessons from the Postwar
Years, 1946-1968," Canadian Foreign Policy III, no. 2 (Fall 1995), 76.
12 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 111; Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 8.
13 smith, Rogue Tory, 448.
14 Agriculture Minister Alvin Hamilton would later remark: " ... he was completely
off his rocker for three or four months! You have to admit it, he was unstable.
He just seemed confused .... " cited in Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker:
Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart,
1990), 172. See Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 115.
1S Bruce Thordarson, "Posture and Policy: Leadership in Canada's External
Affairs," International Journal XXXI, no. 4 (Autumn 1976), 676.
16 This is with the notable exception of Britain, which was warned of the
brewing crisis on October 19. See Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, "Canada, the United
States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Pacific Historical Review, no. 18, (May
1979), 163.
17 The United States military had five stages of vigilance which ranged from
DefCon Five (Normal) to DefCon One (War). DefCon Three indicated severe
international tension. The Canadian military used a similar, but not equivalent,
scale of graduated alerts. "The big difference was that the US DefCon system
could be kept internal to the military whereas the Canadian/NATO system involved
civilian agencies beyond the military vigilance level." Haydon, The 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis, 148. The American DefCon Two, for example, was more along the
lines of the Canadian Simple Alert. For a more complete description of the
Canadian military vigilance measures, please refer to Appendix II.
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Prime Minister to ask him to call an emergency Cabinet session to
authorize a corresponding state of military preparedness. 18 To Harkness'
surprise, Diefenbaker balked at his request, deciding instead to
schedule a Cabinet meeting for the next morning. 19 When Cabinet convened
the next day, there was no agreement on what to do. There was a serious
split, with Harkness, and Associate Minister of Defence Pierre Sevigny
championing an immediate alert for Canadian forces, and Secretary of
State for External Affairs Howard Green and Diefenbaker leading the
resistance. 2o Cabinet met twice more (once more on Tuesday, and once
Wednesday morning), with no decision forthcoming -- no decision to alert
Canadian forces or to endorse Kennedy's quarantine measures. For two
days, the Diefenbaker government was, in Nicholson's words, " ... perched
indecisively upon the fence. ,,21 Only after Harkness was informed that
some of the US military had moved to DefCon 2 was he able to convince
the Prime Minister, whom he "tackled" alone,2;;' to authorize a Canadian
alert.
The conventional wisdom has seized upon the fact that Diefenbaker
eventually made the decision to go to alert without consulting Cabinet,
and has concluded that " ... the Prime Minister's attitude was decisive."
It suggests, with some justification, that had Diefenbaker immediately
"favoured ... action, the Cabinet would certainly have gone along. "23
Thus, the argument is made that Canada's hesitation during the crisis
was largely attributable to the Prime Minister. This inference is
misleading because it ignores the significant divisions within Cabinet
18 At this time, the War Books had been withdrawn for reV1S10n. Consequently,
the Minister of Defence had to go to the Cabinet for authorization for each
change in Canadian military mobilization -- including the discreet phase of
vigilance which, when the War Books were in effect, the Minister could declare
on his own initiative.
19 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 124. Harkness believed that approval would be
a mere formality, and had in fact told the military to begin preparations for
going to alert while he went to seek the necessary authorization from Cabinet.
20 Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 16.
21 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 161.
22 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 45.
23 Ibid., 37.
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on the issue -- divisions that served to reinforce the Prime Minister's
hesitancy.24 Yet this is not the only problem with the prevailing
indecision thesis.
Most egregious is the facile characterization of the dilemma
facing the Canadian government . Essentially, according to Nicholson,
Newman, Harkness et al., there was no dilemma at all -- Canada should
have immediately fallen in line with the American initiative to combat
communist aggression. To do otherwise, they imply, was utterly
incomprehensible. 25 As a consequence, they give no real attention to the
important political issues engaged by the crisis which conflicted with
the desire to follow the United states' lead against communist Russia --
issues such as national sovereignty, and the threat of nuclear war.
Thus, by a logic of omission, the conventional wisdom concludes that
Canada's hesi tation could only have been a function of Diefenbaker's
propensity for indecision rather than of any reasoned choice that he and
others in Cabinet had made. 26
1.2 THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: PART TWO
A second major theme in the literature on the crisis is that Prime
Minister Diefenbaker delayed alerting Canadian forces and withheld
governmental endorsement of American ini tiatives because he would not
allow Canada to be "pushedH around by President Kennedy and the United
states. This argument, made most forcefully by Peyton Lyon and Knowlton
Nash, suggests that Diefenbaker's extreme nationalism, when combined
with his bitter hatred for Kennedy, led the Prime Minister to resist
24 Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet (whose work is examined later in this chapter) suggests
that had the Cabinet been united in wanting to back the United States,
Diefenbaker would not have demurred. Ghent, "Canada, the United States," 177.
2S See Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 155, 167 and 176; Newman, Renegade in
Power, 333, 338. This prejudice in favour of backing the United States may
explain why Nicholson and Newman gloss over the split in Cabinet -- it makes the
wisdom of automatically following the American lead less self-evident.
26 Peter Haydon is certainly correct when he concludes that " .•. there are just
too many other factors to accept such a narrow answer. For instance, one has to
ask to what extent Diefenbaker's reluctance to declare an alert was attributable
to domestic politics." Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 189.
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supporting American efforts to force a Soviet retreat on Cuba. '2.7 This
aspect of the conventional wisdom stands up better under scrutiny, and
offers some insight into the crisis. However, before it is discussed, it
is necessary to briefly examine Diefenbaker's nationalism and his
relationship with President Kennedy.
John Diefenbaker was a patriot. 28 In Canada, that sometimes means
being anti-American, and, according to Knowlton Nash, Diefenbaker was
~ ... anti-American to the tips of his toes."29 Denis Smith offers a more
balanced appraisal of Diefenbaker, stating that while he did not
~ ... have any basic prejudice against the United States, he was tempted
to assert Canadian independence."3o Truly, Diefenbaker believed himself
to be a champion of Canadian sovereignty, and he constantly opposed the
erosion of Canada's right to independent action. As Prime Minister, he
was particularly touchy about Canada's relationship with the United
States, and was quite sensitive to the charge that he, in hastily
signing NORAD, had surrendered Canadian sovereignty in any way
whatsoever. In the event of crisis, he would affirm, Canada would be
consulted by its ally over what course would be taken. 31
Significantly, Diefenbaker's nationalism did not overly affect
Canadian-American relations until after President Dwight Eisenhower
retired from office. Eisenhower, whom Diefenbaker admired, treated the
Prime Minister with incredible solicitude, and was always anxious to
ensure that the two men got along. Diefenbaker, in turn, had much in
27 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 37; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 172. See
also J.L. Granatstein, "When Push Carne to Shove: Canada and the united States,"
in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy
1961-1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 96-97.
28 Sevigny, This Game, 8.
29 Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 13.
30 Smith, Rogue Tory, 380.
31 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 54. Diefenbaker would always affirm
that NORAD enhanced Canadian sovereignty, rather than diminished it. For an
example of this, see Diefenbaker's speech at Dartmouth College made in September
1957. A copy of it is included in Arthur Blanchette, Canadian Foreign Policy
1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Statements (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1977) •
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common with the US President, and was flattered by the respect and
deference that Eisenhower showed him. The excellent personal rapport
that developed between the two leaders went far in facilitating good
relations between their respective governments. In later years,
Diefenbaker would observe that while Eisenhower was in office, "Canada
was not treated as a forty-ninth state composed of Mounted Police,
Eskimos and summer vacationers."32
President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was another matter altogether.
Diefenbaker came to hate the young President, who was more than happy to
reciprocate in kind. The Prime Minister's dislike for Kennedy was
evident well before the Cuban missile crisis broke. As far back as July
12, 1959, Diefenbaker was already voicing reservations about the then
Senator, considering him to be nothing more than a brash political
opportunist. 33 The day after Kennedy defeated Republican candidate
Richard Nixon to become the thirty-fifth President of the United States,
the Prime Minister expressed serious misgivings to his liaison officer
with External Affairs, Basil Robinson. Diefenbaker, with remarkable
prescience, told Robinson that " ...wi th Kennedy in control, we were
closer to war than we had been before."34 Nonetheless, Diefenbaker made
an attempt, perhaps half-hearted, to develop some sort of rapport with
the new President. He was not successful.
Much of the problem lay in the Prime Minister's considerable
personal insecurity. 35 Indeed, Diefenbaker saw much to envy in the
President youth, charisma, breeding, popularity, and wealth.
Moreover, Diefenbaker sensed that " ... there was a new phenomenon on the
political scene ... [and] he was worried about how it would affect him."36
In short, Kennedy's dynamism was threatening both on a personal and
3L Cited in Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 56.
33 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 146.
34 Ibid. See also Diefenbaker, One Canada III, 79-80.
35 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 165; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker,
60.
3< Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 61. Nash is quoting Basil Robinson.
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political level. Unfortunately, the new President was not Eisenhower,
and had neither the patience nor the understanding necessary to
establish a good working relationship with the Prime Minister. More
importantly, Kennedy was not fond of Diefenbaker, whom he considered an
insincere platitudinous bore, and was not at all inclined to assuage his
personal insecurities and anxieties. 37 Right from the start, the hyper-
sensitive Prime Minister took umbrage at personal slights from the
President, many of them intentional. 38
Further, the Kennedy government, in the Prime Minister's eyes,
evinced ~little respect for Canadian independence. n39 While the breadth
of this thesis does not allow for a full account of all the events
which led Diefenbaker to that conclusion, it is worth mentioning two of
the more notable instances of Kennedy's disregard for Canadian
sovereignty.
The first incident occurred on April 17, 1961. That day, the
United States launched the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. The attack on
Cuba, ill-advised though it was, was not what particularly worried
Diefenbaker. Rather, the Prime Minister was concerned that Canada was
neither consulted nor informed about the operation by its NORAD partner.
When Kennedy visited Ottawa a month later, Diefenbaker expressed his
hope that Canada would be informed of any future plans involving drastic
action with respect to Cuba. To this, the President responded that he
had learned much from the gaffe, and that " ... the US planned no more
military action in Cuba unless there was a serious provocation. In any
event, he promised, 'We would talk with you before doing anything.,n4o
A second episode illustrative of the Kennedy administration's lack
of respect for Canadian sovereignty occurred during the President's
37 Ibid., 99.
38 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 496. Knowlton Nash devotes much attention to
chronicling the decline of the relationship between Diefenbaker and Kennedy. See
Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, passim.
39 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 190.
40 Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 113.
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visit to Canada in May 1961. Like many of his predecessors, the
President was determined to get Canada to join the Organization of
American States (OAS). Unfortunately, Kennedy's zeal took him too far.
When the topic was first broached in private conversation with the
President, Diefenbaker made it quite clear that his government was not
interested in joining the OAS any time soon. Kennedy was not deterred,
however, and went over Diefenbaker's head, bringing the issue up in his
speech to the Canadian Parliament -- a move showing little respect for
the Prime Minister's earlier decision. The President even pressed
Diefenbaker on the OAS during their breakfast the next day. 41 Howard
Green, always a strong defender of Canada's right to independent action,
commented acerbically on Kennedy's antics, stating that ~ .•• one of the
least effective ways of persuading Canada to adopt a policy is for the
President of another country to come here and tell us what we should
do.,,42 In this, he certainly echoed the Prime Minister's views. 43
During the same visi t, a brief written by presidential advisor
Walt Rostow came into Diefenbaker's possession. While the content of the
memorandum was nothing out of the ordinary, the Prime Minister was
incensed by its tone. Most offensive was that it advised Kennedy to
~push Canada towards,,44 a number of policies favourable to US interests.
To Diefenbaker, the phrasing of the Rostow memo typified ~ ... the
attitude of Americans: they thought nothing of pushing Canada around.,,45
The Prime Minister, however, would not be bullied by President Kennedy,
and nei ther would Canada. If anything, that sentiment would harden
during the months leading up to October 1962, and, according to the
41 Ibid., 115; Smith, Rogue Tory, 386; Robert Reford, Canada and Three Crises
(Ontario: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1968), 164.
42 Reford, Canada, 206-207.
43 J. L. Granatstein, "When Push Carne to Shove,u 93.
44 DCCA, MG01/XXI/85/D/113.
45 H. B. Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 206-207. Diefenbaker would hang on the
memo, and even considered making it public during the course of the 1962
elections, which threatened to take on a decidedly anti-American flavour. See
Smith, Rogue Tory, 432; Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 38.
conventional wisdom,
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is the key to understanding the Canadian
government's reaction to the Cuban missile crisis. 46
On Sunday, October 21, 1962, Diefenbaker was informed by Canadian
diplomatic sources that tensions were rising between the United States
and Cuba over the alleged presence of Soviet nuclear weaponry on the
tiny Caribbean island~ He did not know the details of the situation, but
he knew with dreadful certainty that any US confrontation with Cuba
would invariably affect Canada. All the Prime Minister could do for the
time being was wait for events to develop further.
The next morning, Diefenbaker was notified that the former US
ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, was coming to Ottawa that
afternoon to deliver an urgent message from the United States
government. At 5:15 Monday evening, Merchant met with the Prime
Minister, Defence Minister Harkness, and External Affairs Minister
Green, presenting them with a communique from the President. In his
letter to the Prime Minister, Kennedy briefly detailed the discovery of
the nuclear missile bases, and informed Diefenbaker of the planned
American quarantine of Cuba. The President then asked Diefenbaker to
support an American resolution which would be placed before the Security
Council calling for the ~ ...withdrawal of missile bases and other
offensive weapons in Cuba."4 7 Following the reading of Kennedy's
missive, Merchant provided Diefenbaker, Green, and Harkness wi th the
photographic evidence of the missile sites, taken days earlier by
American spy planes. He then outlined in more detail the actions the
Uni ted States was taking concerning Cuba. Finally, Merchant concluded
the meeting by presenting the text of the speech that President Kennedy
46 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 492.
4
7 Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet and Don Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in
Cuba, 1962," in Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy:
Selected Cases (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), 84.
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would broadcast little over an hour later. 48 The American envoy then
left to brief Under-Secretary for External Affairs Norman Robertson, and
Air Chief Marshall Frank Miller. With nothing he could really do at that
point, Diefenbaker went home to eat supper and watch Kennedy's
broadcast.
Al though he did not say so to Merchant, the Prime Minister was
furious with the US government. 49 Characterizing Diefenbaker's reaction
to the briefing, Basil Robinson suggests that,
... despite what he had learned in advance, it would have been
completely out of character if [Diefenbakerl had not been upset at
being presented with the evidence of the Soviet missiles and the
outline of the President's plans, at a stage when he could do
little more than acknowledge their receipt. It was, after all, a
very important development for the defence of North America, and
it had been he who had entered (hastily, it will be recalled) into
the NORAD agreement five years before ... The Prime Minister's
resentment at the absence of genuine consultation should have come
as no surprise. 50
Following the broadcast of Kennedy's speech, the Prime Minister
made a statement to the House of Conunons at the behest of Liberal
Opposi tion leader Lester Pearson. Basing his address on a memorandum
from External Affairs, Diefenbaker appealed for calm and solidarity, and
asserted that nuclear missile bases in Cuba could not be interpreted in
any way as defensive. He then proposed:
... that the united Nations should be charged at the earliest
possible moment with this serious problem ... If there is a desire
on the part of the U. S. S. R. to have the facts, if a group of
nations, perhaps the eight nations comprising the unaligned
members of the 18 nation disarmament committee, be given the
opportunity of making an on-site inspection in Cuba to ascertain
what the facts are, a major step forward would be taken. This is
the only suggestion I have at this moment; but it would provide an
objective answer to what is going on in CUba.~l
48 Diefenbaker did secure some changes to the wording of the speech -- Kennedy
removed some disparaging remarks aimed at Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko.
49 Noting that Diefenbaker seemed irritable and distracted, Merchant nonetheless
came away from the meeting under the impression that the Prime Minister
empathized with the Americans, and would ~ ... give public support to the
President." Smith, Rogue Tory, 456.
50 H.B. Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 285.
51 Canada, House of Commons Debates (cited hereinafter as Debates), 22 October,
1962, 806.
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It was not the statement of unequivocal support for the quarantine
for which the Americans had hoped. Diefenbaker's speech seemed to cast
doubts on the claims made by President Kennedy only hours earlier.
According to Knowlton Nash, that may have been exactly what the Prime
Minister intended. 52
The United States government was taken by surprise by the Prime
Minister's speech in the House of Commons -- especially since Livingston
Merchant had earlier reported that Diefenbaker was on side. Indeed, a
press release issued following the President's broadcast had even made
" •.. specific reference to the Canadian support that Merchant thought
Diefenbaker had given.,,53 Upon hearing of the press statement, the Prime
Minister launched into an angry tirade, saying
'That young man has got to learn that he is not running the
Canadian government •.. What business has he got? There is no
decision which has been made as yet. I am the one who is going to
decide and I am the one who has to make the declaration. He is not
the one.' ~4
When Defence Minister Harkness approached the Prime Minister later
that evening to get Cabinet approval for moving Canadian forces to the
equivalent of DefCon 3, Diefenbaker refused to call a meeting. still
"propelled by his fury at Kennedy's failure to consult him,,,55 the Prime
Minister dismissed Harkness, stating that Cabinet would discuss the
issue the next morning.
When Cabinet met the next day, opinion was sharply divided between
those who favoured immediately declaring an alert, and those who wanted
to "go slow,,56 and avoid provocation. Green, whose views were quite
similar to those held by the Prime Minister, delivered an emotional plea
~ Nash cites Minister of Post Ellen Fairclough as saying that "the Prime
Minister made the proposal largely because Diefenbaker did not trust Kennedy."
Former Conservative MP Dick Thrasher and Citizenship and Immigration Minister
Richard Bell confirm that the Prime Minister doubted Kennedy's motives about
Cuba, and that he thought that the President was "playing politics with Cuba."
See Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 186-189.
~3 Ibid., 190.
54 Sevigny recalls Diefenbaker's outburst in Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 14-15.
~s Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 191.
&6 Ghent-Mallet and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 87-88.
25
not to rush blindly into supporting the United States, especially since
~ ..• the United States President had not kept the commitment to consult
with Canada over the impending crisis. 'If we go along with the
Americans now, ' he said, 'we'll be their vassals forever. ' ,,57
Diefenbaker echoed Green's argument, stating that Canada should not
~snap to attention" in support for Kennedy's dangerous political
posturing over Cuba. 58 In the end, according to one Minister, the
decision was made to put off declaring an alert for the time being so as
to " ... register dissatisfaction with Washington's failure to consult
earlier with Ottawa."S9
That afternoon, President Kennedy telephoned the Prime Minister to
complain about the lack of Canadian support for the US position, both in
and out of the United Nations. 60 Specifically, the President asked that
Canadian NORAD forces be put on an alert status equivalent to DefCon 3.
Diefenbaker tersely refused the President's request, stating: "No, we
can't possibly do that!,,61 The Prime Minister then went to the heart of
the matter, asking: "When were we consulted?" To this, Kennedy snapped:
"You weren't.,,62 In the end, Kennedy's phone call served only to deepen
Diefenbaker's predilection to dig in his heels at American pressure.
The same afternoon, however, Diefenbaker would assert in the House
of Commons that his previous suggestion for a UN inspection group was
not intended to " ... cast any doubts on the facts of the situation as
outlined by the President of the United States in his television
57 Cited in Newman, Renegade in Power, 337. Notwithstanding the fact that
"neither Mr. Green nor any other of the other ex-ministers whom [he] consulted
recall such a statement during the Cuban crisis," Lyon asserts that "irritation
with the short notice given the government by Washington was probably an
important factor in the Prime Minister's thinking." See Lyon, Canada in World
Affairs, 37.
58 Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 193.
59 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 37.
60 There is some debate as to when the telephone call occurred. Diefenbaker
wrote in his memoirs that Kennedy phoned him on Monday, October 22. Most
accounts of the crisis suggest that it most likely occurred the next day, on
Tuesday afternoon.
61 Cited in Granatstein and Hillmer, For Better or Worse, 205.
62 Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 196; Smith, Rogue Tory, 458; Diefenbaker, One
Canada III, 83.
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address."63 Rather, the Prime Minister would suggest, the proposal was
intended to supplement the initiatives undertaken by the United States.
Cabinet met again on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday morning. Both
times Diefenbaker, supported by Green, resisted demands by Harkness,
Sevigny, and Trade and Commerce Minister George Hees that Canada should
go to alert, stating: ~Kennedy is trying to push us into this thing and
we shouldn't be pushed. "64 To bolster his position, which by Wednesday
was only supported by a minority of ministers, Diefenbaker made
reference to an alleged telephone discussion he had with British Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan, in which he was told ~ ... that the United
Kingdom had not gone on alert and would not, at this stage, since
addi tional mobilization could easily be interpreted as a provocative
measure by the Russians."6s Arguing that mobilizing the Canadian
military had the possibility of destabilizing the tense diplomatic
situation, Diefenbaker was convinced that discretion was the better part
of valour. No alert was declared. No overt support for the United states
position was forthcoming. 66
Later that Wednesday, however, the United states moved its
Strategic Air Command and some of its naval forces to DefCon 2
immediate enemy attack expected. Harkness believed that it was now
absolutely necessary that Canadian forces be formally alerted, and he
went back to the PMO to force Diefenbaker's hand. 67 Faced with this new
63 Debates, (October 23, 1962), 821.
64 Cited in Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 199.
65 Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 17; Ghent, "Canada, the United states," 174.
66 Cabinet did take steps to prohibit the overflight of Canada by soviet
aircraft, and to ensure that the planes of Soviet satellites were searched for
war materials if they chose to enter Canadian airspace. Other steps concerning
the rotation of troops and the manning of warning centers were taken so as to
allow for a rapid mobilization if it became necessary. See Cabinet Conclusions,
(October 23, 1962), 2-3; Cabinet Conclusions, (October 24, 1962), 2-6.
61 Frustrated with Cabinet's refusal to declare an alert, Harkness went behind
Diefenbaker's back Tuesday morning, ordering the armed forces to go to alert in
"as quiet and unobtrusive a way as possible." H. Basil Robinson contends that
Diefenbaker was aware that the military was secretly going to alert, and
" ... just let it happen informally." Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 195; H. B.
Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 288.
27
information, the Prime Minister " ... shook his head ruefully and said,
'Oh well, all right, go ahead .•. go ahead."68
It was not until the next day, Thursday October 25, that
Diefenbaker offered a public endorsement of the American actions in the
House of Commons -- " ... so that the attitude of the government [would]
clearly be understood." 69 The Prime Minister resolutely affirmed that
" •••we intend to support the United States and our other allies in this
situation."70 Canada, however belatedly, was now backing the US
position. Peyton Lyon would later note that Diefenbaker's speech, when
compared " ... to the statements being made by the leaders of the other
allies of the United States, ...was still conspicuously lacking in
expressions of confidence in President Kennedy's leadership."il
Looking back at the crisis, here does indeed seem to be
considerable support for the conclusion that Diefenbaker " •.. responded
slowly and reluctantly because he had been offended by the failure of
the American President to take him fully into his confidence before the
late afternoon of October 22 ... "7 2 However persuasive this argument may
be, it is, nevertheless, incomplete. Its main fault stems from the fact
that the government's motives during the crisis are interpreted in a
socio-political vacuum. Was Diefenbaker just an anomalous individual
acting purely according to personal preferences? Were Harkness and
Green? To what extent did society buttress or weaken their individual
inclinations towards action? What important political issues were at
stake? The Diefenbaker-centred focus of the conventional argument leaves
6& Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 200.
69 Debates, (October 25, 1962), 912.
70 Debates, (October 25, 1962), 912.
71 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 47.
7~ Ibid., 60. Douglas Harkness suggests that "if it had been Eisenhower he was
dealing with and not Kennedy, it would have been very different. He just had an
obsession about Kennedy.H Basil Robinson follows a similar line, stating that
" •.• if he had been taken into the American confidence, the Prime Minister might
well have agreed to put the forces on alert much sooner than he did. H See Nash,
Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 184-206.
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these questions unanswered, and as a consequence, provides an incomplete
understanding of the crisis.
2. 'Revisionist' Interpretations of the Crisis: The Perspective Broadens
In contrast to most accounts of Canada's role in the Cuban missile
crisis, three works in particular challenge ~ ... the conventional wisdom
that most of the problems were products of Diefenbaker's
idiosyncrasies.n73 Three case studies, written by Robert Reford, Jocelyn
Ghent-Mallet, 74 and Peter Haydon respectively, examine the October
crisis in considerable detail and provide students of Canadian foreign
policy with a much more comprehensive explanation of why the Diefenbaker
government reacted the way it did. Of particular relevance to the thesis
is that each work includes some consideration of the socio-poli tical
context which framed the crisis in Canada. The following section of this
chapter will briefly examine how Reford, Ghent-Mallet and Haydon
contribute to an understanding of events, and will discuss how the
thesis builds upon their insights.
2.1 Robert Reford
In his 1968 study, Reford examines the Off-shore Islands crises,
the Suez crisis, and the Cuban missile crisis in an attempt to
illustrate that ~ .•. there is an instinctive Canadian reaction to an
international crisis which is constant, regardless of the circumstances
or of the political party in office. ,,7'5 He suggests that the normal
Canadian approach to an international crisis is to: avoid violence, go
to the United Nations, and ensure that Canadian sovereignty is
respected. 76 The Canadian response to the Cuban missile crisis, he
73 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 10.
74 Ghent-Mallet's 1992 article with Don Munton is a revised edition of her 1979
work. For the purposes of this thesis, the two publications are considered
together.
75 Reford, Canada, vii.
76 Ibid., 214.
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submits, was perfectly illustrative of this instinctive reaction.
According to Reford, the decision to delay going to alert was consistent
not only with the desire to avoid provocation and escalation, but also
with the ~ •.. normal sensitivity for Canadian policy to be made in ottawa
and the anxiety to avoid the appearance of answering automatically when
Washington called. ,,77 Similarly, Diefenbaker's proposal for an
independent United Nations inspection team, is construed as satisfying
the traditional Canadian desire to resolve international crises under
the auspices of the United Nations. 78
Generally, there is considerable merit in Reford's examination of
the October crisis. However, his most important analytical contribution
is that he frames the Canadian government's decisions in a way that
highlights their societal context. While he acknowledges the Prime
Minister's personal impact on Canada's response to the crisis,7? Reford
portrays the government's reaction as rooted in fundamental principles
which gird Canadian national life. Unfortunately, there are some
problems in Reford's analysis of societal impact on foreign policy.
First and foremost is that he regards the values and goals of Canadian
society as immutable constants. 80 When conceptualizing the instinctive
Canadian reaction to international crises, Reford neglects the fact that
society is continually in a state of flux. Consequently, he gives
insufficient attention to the conflicting impulses which are thrown into
opposition as society evolves. 81 As a result, he does not fully explain
the divisions wi thin Cabinet during the crisis, or even the eventual
77 Ibid., 206.
78 Ibid., 178. Reford explains that "this would be a Canadian initiative, and it
would show that Canada was prepared to put forward suggestions rather than
automatically follow a policy which Washington had adopted. In addition, it
might buy time, and time might be important if the world were to avoid being
~lunged into a nuclear holocaust."
9 Ibid., 205-207.
80 Ibid., ix, 8. Reford ascribes particular validity to these principles because
they strengthen Canada's capacity as a middle-power to influence international
?ffairs, rather than because they reflect Canadian society. See ibid., 233-239.
bl Reford does draw attention, however, to the divisive nuclear warhead issue
which complicated the decision-making process during the crisis. Ibid., 184-185,
206.
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decision to go to alert and support the United States. 82 This thesis, by
contrast, will place the Diefenbaker government's actions in the context
of a society undergoing significant and tumultuous change.
A second problem with Reford's analysis is that he does not
explain the linkage between Canada's so-called national principles and a
particular foreign policy decision. 83 Essentially, he does not reveal
how and when these principles become policy. 84 Nor does he reveal how
and when these principles do not become policy. In the case of Cuba,
Reford does not really explore why Canada's instinctive reaction
manifested itself -- he only suggests that it did. This thesis, by using
Robinson's framework to highlight the nexus between society and the
decision-maker, hopes to rectify this omission.
2.2 Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet
Like Reford before her, Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet is another scholar
who examines the Cuban missile crisis in great detail. Her two excellent
case studies on the subject warrant special consideration for a number
of reasons.
Of all the literature that covers Canada's role in the October
crisis, Ghent-Mallet's work is unique in the depth of its exploration of
the differences of opinion within the Diefenbaker government. Lamenting
that most secondary accounts " ... have paid insufficient attention to the
divisions within the Cabinet ... ,u85 she examines how the various cabinet
&2 In his explanation of why Canada waited forty-two hours to go to alert and of
why Canada waited seventy-two hours to pUblicly back the United states, Reford
does not address why Diefenbaker chose to reverse his earlier decision to delay.
Ibid., 204-215.
83 All Reford says on this topic is that in times of crisis, ~ •.• where time is
of the essence, the instinctive reaction is most likely to show itself and
through it, the true nature of a country's attitude to world affairs will become
apparent." Ibid., 243.
8 Ibid., 244-245. "How were these principles applied in practice? Principles
are not policy and a great deal can depend on how they are put into operation.
In crisis diplomacy, it is important not to base policy simply on an automatic
response, like one of Pavlov's dogs." Beyond this, Reford leaves this question
9fen for further study.
e. Ghent, "Canada, the United States," 172.
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ministers reacted to the crisis. Her research reveals an interesting
picture. On the one side were Douglas Harkness, Pierre Sevigny, and
George Hees, leading those who favoured going to an immediate alert.
Leading the resistance were Diefenbaker, Howard Green, Alvin Hamilton,
Waldo Monteith, and Richard Bell. The remaining ministers, comprising
~ ... approximately half the Cabinet, ...were at first uncertain as how to
proceed. H86 Ghent-Mallet asserts that while they ~ ... came eventually to
support Harkness, their varying degrees of resentment over the United
States' failure to consult Canada initially strengthened the position
taken by Diefenbaker and Green. H87 Hence, Ghent-Mallet dispels the
notion that the lack of a Cabinet decision could be blamed on the Prime
Minister alone. Instead, she shows that the split within Cabinet was
quite significant, and that it cannot be ignored when attempting to
explain why the Canadian government hesitated to follow the American
lead.
Another way that Ghent-Mallet contributes to a greater
understanding of the crisis is by drawing attention to President
Kennedy's October 22 letter to the Prime Minister. Examining the text of
the President's missive, she notes that in comparison to the communique
sent to Prime Minister Macmillan, the message Diefenbaker received did
not include
•.. a lengthy exposition on the dangers of the crisis or ... offers
of private discussion. In the much shorter message to Diefenbaker,
therefore, the President appears to be placing greater emphasis on
a solution through the United Nations. Since turning to the UN was
the traditional Canadian instinct in time of crisis, this
undoubtedly struck a chord with Canadians. 8s
Thus, she suggests that Kennedy's letter may have reinforced
Diefenbaker's personal inclination to seek a UN solution to the
crisis. 89
8E, Ghent-Mallet and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 87.
67 Ghent, "Canada, the United States," 172-173.
B8 Ghent-Mallet and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 84.
&9 Ghent, "Canada, the United States," 166.
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Ghent-Mallet's two case studies are especially significant in that
they make reference to the socio-political context in Canada and how it
affected the way the crisis was handled. In her analysis of the
Diefenbaker government's actions, Ghent-Mallet draws upon Reford's
conceptualization of a typical Canadian response to crises. She concurs
with his earlier assessment that both the call for a UN inspection team
and the initial decision to delay going to alert were consistent with
the instinctive Canadian approach to international dilemmas. 9o Notably,
Ghent-Mallet observes that
... this approach had been voiced by the leaders of all national
parties in the House of Commons after the President's speech, and
it was one that had always won popular support. Given the
uncertain status of his minority government, voter approval was
certainly one of Diefenbaker's concerns if not one of the rest of
the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister was sure that the majority of
the electorate would not approve Kennedy's action or want to be
militarily involved in the Cuban affair. 9
In doing so, Ghent-Mallet draws attention to the politics of the
October crisis. Unfortunately, given the scope of her two case-studies,
she is unable to examine in depth this dimension of decision-making.
This thesis, by contrast, is concerned solely with the politics of the
Diefenbaker government's decisions.
2.3 Peter Haydon
Undoubtedly, Peter Haydon's 1993 book is the most comprehensive
account of the crisis. Writing three decades after the fact, the former
Royal Canadian Navy Commander is able to take advantage of previously
classified information to provide an exhaustive account of Canada's role
90 Ibid., 167, 174; Ghent-Mallet and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 84.
Consequently, this aspect of her analysis is subject to the same criticism
leveled against Reford. However, Ghent-Mallet examines the considerable sympathy
within Canada for Cuba's plight, and points out the increasing importance of
" ... exercising the right to an independent foreign policy." Ghent, "Canada, the
United states," 175.
91 Ibid., 174-175.
33
in the events of October 1962. 92 His incisive examination is
particularly noteworthy for the following reasons.
First and foremost, Haydon explores in considerable depth the
mili tary dimension of the crisis in Canada and how it influenced the
decision-making process. Taking issue with the narrow focus of the
conventional wisdom, he instead " ... places Canadian actions in the
larger context of national defence policy, nuclear weapons, civil-
military relations, and the whole fabric of defence cooperation between
Canada and United States in the early 1960s. ,,93 Haydon describes the
military command structure in Canada, focusing especially on NORAD and
its implications for Canadian sovereignty. Notably, he points out that
the Diefenbaker government's understanding of consultation was at
variance with that held by the military on both sides of the border.
While Diefenbaker, and many other politicians wi thin Canada, 94
~ ...believed in [the necessity of] consultation at the highest political
level, ... the Canadian and US military staffs and the American political
system believed that consultation should take place at working levels as
part of the coordination process.,,9S Thus, Haydon is able to explain, in
good measure, why the Canadian mili tary, under the orders of Defence
Minister Harkness, went to a de facto state of alert without Cabinet
approval.
Of particular relevance to this thesis, however, is Haydon's
second major contribution to a more complete understanding of events --
he draws attention to the domestic political implications of the crisis.
In light of the Diefenbaker government's precarious position within
92 "He provides an unmatched day-by-day, indeed hour-by-hour account of Canada's
involvement." Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel in Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis, xii. Notably, Haydon details Canada's military participation in the
crisis -- especially its role in the joint anti-submarine operations.
93 Sokolsky and Jockel in Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, xii.
94 This includes members of the Liberal party, who would later charge that the
crisis was an episode where " ... the governing principle of civil control of the
military had been compromised ..•. " Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 4.
95 Ibid., 181.
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Parliament, Haydon points out that ~ ... the political price of
miscalculation was very high ... ,,96 In handling the crisis, he suggests
that the Progressive Conservatives had to walk a very fine line.
Essentially, they had to act in such a way that would not leave them
" ... open to cri ticism from Pearson and the Opposition front bench ... ,,97
Haydon points out that the Cuban missile crisis forced the Canadian
government to " ... face not one but several difficult political issues,
each in conflict with another." 9B He suggests that, in the end,
Diefenbaker probably " ... thought he was playing to public opinion by
standing up to the Americans and stressing a UN role.,,99 What is
noteworthy here is that Haydon identifies the poli tical difficulty of
the crisis as stemming directly from the important issues in Canadian
society that were brought into conflict. However, like Ghent-Mallet, he
offers this insight into the decision-making process of the crisis
without exploring it fully.
This thesis is not the first to examine the impact of Canadian
society on the Diefenbaker government's handling of the Cuban missile
crisis. Reford, Ghent-Mallet, and Haydon have all offered useful
observations on this dimension of the decision-making process. Yet, much
remains to be explored. Using Robinson's framework to highlight the link
between society and policy, this thesis will build on their insights.
9E Ibid., 194.
q~ Ibid., 180.
98 Ibid., 179-180. Haydon posits that ~the alert state acquired a symbolic
status as an umbrella issue for all the foreign and defence policy issues opened
up by the crisis." See ibid., 128.
99 Ibid., 122. Haydon concludes his twelve page discussion of why Canada
hesitated by stating: "Overall, one comes to the conclusion that Diefenbaker
delayed the alert for several reasons, all of which were political." See ibid.,
201.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DETERMINANTS OF SOCIETAL IMPACT ON CANADA'S RESPONSE
TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Properly understood, the Canadian response to the Cuban missile
crisis was a function of numerous factors -- some considerably more
important than others. No explanation of decision-making during the
crisis can possibly avoid discussing the personal impact of its key
actors. Thus, as the previous chapter shows, existing accounts of the
crisis focus on the part played by Diefenbaker, and to a lesser extent
Harkness and Green, in determining Canadian policy. In doing so,
however, most works neglect to explore with equal vigour the socio-
political dimensions of the Cuban crisis. This represents an analytical
shortcoming because, as P. Stuart Robinson points out, crises are
formative events par excellence in the evolution of a society.l As such,
they " .•• exhibi t most acutely the logic of collective action and its
collective understanding. H2 With that in mind, this thesis contends that
an adequate explanation as to why Canada equivocated in backing the
Uni ted States in 1962 must necessarily place the Diefenbaker
government's decisions against the backdrop of society. The next two
chapters propose to do just that. In this chapter, there will be a brief
examination of the nature and circumstances of the Diefenbaker
government, characterizing the extent to which considerations of role
and appropriateness dominated political activity in 1962. Discussion
will then turn to the momentous socio-political issues that the Cuban
Missile Crisis brought to a head in Canada. The final chapter will re-
examine the Cuban missile crisis, highlighting the extent to which these
political issues constrained and compelled Diefenbaker and his Cabinet
colleagues in the decision-making process.
1 P. stuart Robinson, "Reason, Meaning and the Institutional context of Foreign
Policy Decision-Making," International Journal XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 410.
G.M. Dillon asserts that "crisis policy-making acts as an identity-defining
activity imbued with political invention and ideology which determines as well
as reflects, the character of domestic politics." Cited in ibid., 423.
2 Ibid., 410.
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1. THE NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IN AUTUMN 1962
According to P. S . Robinson, the degree to which the decision-
making process reflects societal values and concerns is determined in
large part by the desire of a government " .•. to legitimize itself and
its actions.,,3 This thesis contends that, by time the Cuban missile
crisis broke on the world, considerations of role and appropriateness
were especially visible aspects of the Canadian political process.
Characterizing the style of Canadian politics in the years 1961-
1963, Peyton Lyon observes that "appearance, to all parties, thad come]
to matter more than achievement; posture substituted for policy.,,4 This
certainly was the case for the floundering minority government under
John Diefenbaker. In 1962, the summer elections resulted in a veritable
rout of the Progressive Conservatives, reducing by ninety-two their
seats in the House of Commons. It was a shattering reversal of fortune
from their record-setting victory of 1958. Reflecting on the new
complexion of Parliament, Social Credit leader Robert Thompson warned
that the Conservatives now led " ... a House of minori ties,,,5 and that
they ought not forget it. Indeed, to sustain his government, Diefenbaker
would now have to rely on backing from either the Social Credit Party or
the New Democratic Party. The Social Credit Party, not in the mood to
force an election at that point, offered qualified support to the
besieged Conservatives. 6 On the other side of the House, the Liberals,
under a more confident Pearson, sensed that their star was on the rise,
3 Ibid., 428.
4 Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs: 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1968), 3.
5 Robert Thompson as cited in Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Don
Mills: Longman's Canada Ltd., 1968), 130. The new distribution of seats was as
follows: Progressive Conservatives - 116, Liberals - 100, Social Credit - 30,
and New Democrats - 19.
6 It was explicit that while Social Credit would support the Diefenbaker
government, this support was conditional, and would be revoked if the need
presented itself. Moreover, it was not clear that the Creditiste wing of the
Social Credit party was united in endorsing Thompson's willingness to give the
Progressive Conservatives a chance. Deputy-leader Real Caouette, for example,
went on record as saying " ... the country needs a stable government. The quicker
we have another election, the quicker we will have such a government. H
Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 126.
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and this propelled them in their scathing and unrelenting attacks on the
vulnerable Diefenbaker government. 7 Remarking on the viciously partisan
nature of Canada's twenty-fifth Parliament, historian Peter Stursberg
explains that ~ .•.most of the members expected another election to be
called shortly and were in no mood for anything but politicking. So, the
divided Parliament sounded more like the hustings, than a legislative
assembly. ,,8
If in Autumn 1962, the Conservatives had to exercise caution in
face of intense parliamentary scrutiny, the same situation applied to
Diefenbaker, who also had to worry about support within his own party.
Diefenbaker was never the unanimous choice of his party, and his
authori ty was opposed by a significant party minority. 9 Much of his
cabinet was comprised of political rivals and opponents. 10 Nevertheless,
during his first two Parliaments as Prime Minister, Diefenbaker was
relatively secure. After all, it was he who had brought the Progressive
Conservatives back into power after twenty-two years of retreat, and it
was he who had given them the greatest parliamentary majority in
Canadian history. However, with the electoral disaster of June 18, and
the evident decline of Diefenbaker's leadership skills, many in Cabinet,
and the Conservative party in general, were convinced that it was time
for the old leader to step down. 11 According to biographer Denis Smith,
7 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 145; Pierre Sevigny, This Game of Politics
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965), 229-230; Paul Martin, A Very Public
Life: Volume Two -- So Many Worlds (Toronto: Deneau, 1985), 360. Martin claims
that the Liberals "planned to bring about [the Diefenbaker government's] defeat
on a vote of non-confidence a soon as the House assembled."
8 Peter stursberg, Diefenbaker: Leadership Lost 1962-1967 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1976), 13.
9 Interviews with H. Basil Robinson on August 9 and 14, 1995; Patrick Kyba and
Wendy Green-Finlay, "John Diefenbaker as Prime Minister: The Record Re-
examined," in Donald. C. Story and R. Bruce Shepard, eds., The Diefenbaker
Legacy: Politics, Law, and Society Since 1957 (Regina: Canadian Plains Research
Center, 1998), 58-62.
10 Judy LaMarsh in Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 11.
11 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 141-144.
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"'for perhaps one-third of its members, the problems of governing the
country gave way to the problem of changing the leadership."12
In light of the electoral rebuke suffered by his government, and
of challenges from Parliament and from within his own party, one would
expect Diefenbaker to have carefully formulated policy against
considerations of what would be appropriate and/or justifiable -- as
indeed he did. But this did not represent a significant deviation from
Diefenbaker's normal style of leadership.13 According to H. Basil
Robinson, the Prime Minister was always acutely sensitive to the
political implications of the decisions facing his government. 14 In the
formulation of external policy, he viewed each decision in terms of how
it affected Canada domestically.15 Characterizing the underlying motives
which propelled the Prime Minister in his decisions, Robinson suggests
that Diefenbaker ~ ... concentrated on what had to be done to attract the
general approval of the wider Canadian pUblic."16 This does not mean to
say that Diefenbaker was unprincipled -- indeed, as Prime Minister he
was quite aware of his role as leader of Canada, and this responsibility
12 Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker (Toronto:
Macfarlane and Ross, 1995), 452.
13 More than any other Prime Minister, Diefenbaker was " ... concerned with what
the public thought of him and his government. H Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 141.
Diefenbaker never felt politically secure anywhere -- even in his horne riding of
Prince Albert. He was always looking for ways to maintain or increase his
popularity. See Dick Spencer, Trumpets and Drums: John Diefenbaker on the
9ampaign Trail (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 1994), passim.
i4 Interviews with H. Basil Robinson on August 9 and 14, 1995; Ken Rasmussen,
"Bureaucrats and Politicians in the Diefenbaker Era: A Legacy of Mistrust,H in
Story and Shepard, eds., The Diefenbaker Legacy, 160-164.
15 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 16; Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The Canadian
Institute of Strategic Studies), 180; Jocelyn Ghent-Mallet and Don Munton,
"Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba,H in Don Munton and John Kirton,
eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall
Canada, 1992), 79.
16 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 314-315. Robinson suggests that
"political priorities naturally influenced the process of decision-making in
foreign affairs. H He notes that, according to Diefenbaker, "the forces that
would be influential in keeping [the] government in office were basically
domestic rather than international." In ascertaining the national mood,
Diefenbaker relied heavily on his personal correspondence. Peter Newman,
Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd.,
1963), 86: Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 139: Nicholson, Vision and
Indecision, 15, 246, 159-160: H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 144.
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weighed upon him heavily.17 But he was also quite aware that his
political fortunes depended on the extent to which the Canadian public
perceived him to have legitimately discharged that responsibility.
2. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES OF CANADA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS
John F. Kennedy shocked the world with his televised disclosure
that American surveillance had discovered a covert build-up of nuclear
missile bases in Cuba. Decrying the Soviets for their "deliberately
provocative and unjustified" disruption of the status quo, the President
resolutely announced that " ... a strict quarantine on all offensive
military equipment under shipment to Cuba [was being] initiated."IB
Implicit in his speech was the warning that if the Soviets continued in
their actions, war with the United States would be a very distinct
possibility. Kennedy had called Nikita Khrushchev's bluff, and it was
now up to the Soviet Premier to decide the fate of world peace. By the
same token, if Khrushchev was undeterred by the threat of nuclear war,
" ... Kennedy might have to cross the brink first."19
The President's gambit placed the Diefenbaker government in a
awkward position. Although Canada was America's closest ally by virtue
of recent history and joint defense agreements, its government was,
nevertheless, not consulted by Kennedy in the formulation of the risky
Cuba policy. Yet, as a member of NORAD and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), Canada was bound to share in the dire consequences
17 Diefenbaker was quite aware that decisions he made affected the lives of
millions of Canadians. As Prime Minister, he would frequently comment on the
burdens of his position, that no-one could feel the weight of responsibility
that came with occupying Canada's highest office. Interviews with H. Basil
Robinson on August 9 and 14, 1995; Interview with John Hilliker on August 9,
1995; Erika Simpson, "New Ways of Thinking About Nuclear Weapons and Canada's
Defence Policy," in Story and Shepard, eds., The Diefenbaker Legacy, 33, 38-39.
18 Address by President Kennedy on October 22, 1962, as reproduced in David
Larson, The "Cuban Crisis" of 1962: Selected Documents, Chronology and
Bibliography, 2nd ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1986), 61.
19 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev,
castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 239.
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of an American misstep. Confronted wi th a fai t accompli by the US
President, the Diefenbaker government faced difficult choices,
complicated by the momentous societal issues which the crisis brought
into conflict wi thin Canada. 20 Three maj or socio-poli tical issues were
engaged by the October crisis: Canadian nationalism; Canada's solidarity
with its allies in the fight against communism; and, most fundamentally,
Canada's survival.
The following discussion will examine these issues, taking care to
show how and why they were engaged by the Cuban crisis. Notably, it will
explore how each concern figured in media and Parliamentary discourse
during that fateful week, demonstrating the extent to which the Canadian
public and its leaders ascribed importance to each issue during the
crisis as i t evolved. Furthermore, in the case of maintaining allied
solidarity with the United States, the discussion will also illustrate
the extent to which there was an initial divergence in opinion between
the general public and its political leaders.
2.1a THE RISE OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM AND THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE
In the years immediately following the end of World War II, there
was a general consensus on foreign affairs within Canada. Robert Reford,
ci ting the near unanimity wi th which Parliament endorsed the North
Atlantic Treaty in 1949, points out that foreign policy simply was not
" ... the subj ect of maj or controversy in Canadian domestic politics. ,,21
The few arguments which did arise on the topic were typically limited to
disputing the means of Canadian external policy, rather than its ends.
20 P. stuart Robinson asserts that ~ .•• in a cr1S1S states must prepare, explain
and justify that definitively collective action of a national mass society: the
waging of war. To do so requires more than an expression of interest. It
requires an expression, affirmation, and perhaps re-definition of what this
particular nation-state is about as an ethical and political entity.u P. stuart
Robinson, ~Reason, Meaning, and the Institutional Context of Foreign Policy
Decision-Making,U International Journal XLIX, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 423.
21 Reford, Canada and Three Crises (Ontario: Canadian Institute of International
Affairs, 1968), 7.
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In many ways, this remarkable concurrence of opinion on foreign affairs
could be attributed to the hard lessons of 1939-1945, and as well to the
spectre of communism which came to loom large in the post-war world. 22
The necessity of rebuilding the international system, in combination
with the overriding fear of Soviet aggression, served to galvanize the
West. In the case of Canada, these requirements minimized any
differences of opinion Canadians might have had among themselves, as
well as with their NATO allies. 23
By the late 1950s, however, the world was undergoing rapid and
tumultuous change. Massive decolonization was resulting in a
proliferation of new states, uninterested in the conflicts of their old
colonial masters. Great Britain, devastated by the Second World War, was
unmistakably in decline. The Uni ted States, in stark contrast, was
inescapably in the ascendant. While the dictates of the Cold War still
dominated thinking in the Western alliance,24 strains, both economic and
political, were coming to the fore (for example, the Suez crisis). At
the same time, there was a dawning realization of the moral and
strategic dilemmas posed by the awesome destructive power of the atom.
The world was in transition, and so was Canada.
Indeed, Canadian society was experiencing a transformation of
considerable magnitude -- a coming of age of sorts. In describing the
evolving socio-political milieu of 1957, Peter C. Newman observed that
decisive shifts in a nation's political history are seldom
discernible from their undramatic beginnings. Moods and ideas
change, men begin to question accepted beliefs, and finally the
shifting political climate finds expression in a strong new leader
who, almost intuitively, manages to gauge the nameless but
profound discontent stirring in the land. Having correctly
22 Interview with John Hilliker on August 9, 1995; Interviews with H. Basil
Robinson on August 9 and 14, 1995.
23 Denis Smith observes: "By 1948 there were no big issues in Canadian politics.
In foreign policy, as the dangers of the Cold War deepened, there was virtual
consensus that the country had no choice but to shelter under American
protection while playing helpful mediator at the United Nations when it could."
Smith, Rogue Tory, 166.
24 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, " ... the Cold War seemed less perpetual in
prospect and NATO's purpose more open to debate." Thus, the East-West conflict
may have had a diminished capacity to foster Western unity than was earlier the
case. H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 313.
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interpreted and articulated the nation's mood, he becomes
irresistible. 25
In Canada, this strong new leader was John George Diefenbaker, and
his advent as Prime Minister represented a ~revolution" in the national
psyche. 26 In part, the widespread appeal of Diefenbaker and his newly
elected Progressive Conservative government reflected ~the emergence of
a new national political maturity [in Canada] ."27 Challenging Canadians
to fulfill their appointment with destiny, Diefenbaker invoked a vision
of national greatness which resonated with the growing mood of self-
sufficiency and sel f-assertiveness. 28 From the outset, his government
articulated a policy of national independence that placed a premium on
Canada's ability to ~ ... determine the right stand to take on
problems, [to] keep in mind the Canadian background and, above all, [to]
use Canadian common sense. ,,29 Given the growing sensi tivi ty wi thin
Canada to US domination, the general popularity of such a pro-Canadian
policy comes as no surprise. 30
Canada, it must be remembered, was created in an act of negative
will. 31 Its birth, and continued existence can be explained in part by
25 Newman, Renegade in Power, 49.
26 Peter Regenstrief, The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada:
An Inter,pretation (Toronto: Longman's Canada Ltd., 1965), 9.
27 Donald C. story, "Book Review of H. Basil Robinson's Diefenbaker's World: A
Populist in Foreign Affairs,H Saskatchewan History XLII, no. 89 (Autumn 1989),
121.
28 Ibid., 122-123. See also J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal
Elections (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 316: Colin Campbell, and William
Christian, Parties, Leaders, and Ideologies in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson Ltd., 1996), 172-173.
29 Howard Green in a speech made on February 10, 1960. Cited in Reford, Canada,
153.
30 The popular support for Diefenbaker's pro-Canadian foreign policy can be seen
in the reaction to his refusal to accede to United States pressure concerning
trade with Cuba. For example, in the October 26, 1960, article "Canada's Cuban
Policy," the Charlottetown Guardian had the following comments: "The Canadian
government is being commended by all parties in this country for having the
courage to resist pressures from Washington and the wisdom to follow an
independent Canadian course. H The Vancouver Sun, in a February 3, 1962, article
entitled "Diefenbaker's Sensible Voice,H concurred, stating: "As Mr. Diefenbaker
said, we must follow the course we think best for Canada. Prime Minister
Diefenbaker spoke in a clear, sensible, Canadian voice which deserves the
support of his fellow Canadians. H
31 Of course, there were many positive reasons behind Confederation. The point
here is that anti-Americanism was, and will always be, one of the defining
characteristics of the Canadian identity. See Martin Lipset in M.A. Schwartz,
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the desire of most Canadians not to be American. 32 Thus, it was
particularly irksome (and ironic) for Canadians to discover that, having
finally achieved poli tical autonomy from Great Britain, they were now
falling into a dependent position with the United States. 33 Most
alarming was the extent to which Canada was becoming reliant on the US
for its commerce. By 1957, trade with America accounted for roughly two-
thirds of Canada's imports and exports. 34 Anxiety over this economic
domination was one motivation behind Prime Minister's announcement in
June of that year of his government's intent to divert 15% of Canadian
imports from the United States to Great Britain. 35 Five years later, in
1962, US investment in the Canadian economy continued unabated.
According to a Bureau of Statistics report for that year,
... 90% of our rubber industry, 96% of automobiles and parts, 69%
of petroleum and natural gas, 67% of electrical apparatus and 66%
of smelting and refining of non-ferrous ores [was] under US
capital control. Of the 6712 Canadian concerns controlled outside
this country, 4,240 [were] held in the US. 36
With such a large share of Canadian industry under American
direction, more and more Canadians, of all partisan affiliations, were
becoming concerned about the implications of foreign ownership for
Canadian sovereignty. 37 Similarly, there was growing apprehension over
Public qpinion and Canadian Identity (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1967), vi.
32 In 1967, Blair Fraser wrote: "without at least a touch of anti-Americanism,
Canada would have no reason to exist. Of all general definitions of the
Canadians, this is the most nearly valid: twenty million people who, for
anything up to twenty million reasons, prefer not to be Americans." Blair
Fraser, The Search For Identity: Canada, 1945-1967 (Toronto: Doubleday Canada
Ltd., 1967), 30l.
33 Schwartz, Public qpinion, 13, 59.
34 Robert Bothwell, Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 73. This number was approximately
the same in 1962. See D. Forster, "The Economy," in John T. Saywell, ed.,
Canadian Annual Review, 1962 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 150-
216.
35 Smith, Rogue Tory, 251-257; Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and
Loathing Across the Undefended Border (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990),
47.
36 As cited by Walter Stewart in "US Investment in Canada has Tiger by the
Tail," Toronto Telegram, (September 12, 1962).
37 J.L. Granatstein, "When Push Carne to Shove: Canada and the united states," in
T.G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy 1961-
1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 87; Eldegard Mahant and Graeme
cultural penetration by the United states
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American cinema,
television, and periodicals abounded, flooding the Canadian market. 38 At
the same time, too, the wisdom of Canada's close military alliance with
an increasingly aggressive United States was being called into
question. 39 In short, a significant number of Canadians 40 believed that
unless Canada began asserting its independence, it would cease to exist
as a sovereign entity.41 To them, ~ •.. there was more than mere
rhetoric ... ,,42 in the pro-Canadian positions adopted by their national
leaders.
That the concern for Canadian independence was an important issue
engaged by the Cuban crisis is shown by the extent to which it figured
in both the media and Parliament. Surveying the press response to
President Kennedy's embargo, one finds that considerable anxiety was
expressed over the fact that the Americans did not consult Canada when
Mount, An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations, 2nd ed. (Scarborough:
Nelson Canada, 1989), 229.
38 Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove," 87. The O'Leary Commission was formed
in 1962 to tackle the issue of protecting Canada's publications from American
competition.
39 James Minifie argued that an independent Canada had the potential for a
glorious future -- "but not as the client of a power committed to the struggle
for paramountcy." For Minifie, "an impregnable neutralism [had to] be [Canada's]
warranty of independence." James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1960), 174. See also Tom Keating, Canada
and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1993), 151.
40 Peyton Lyon cites a December 1961 Gallup poll indicating 38 per cent as
believing that American influence over Canada was "unduly great." Lyon, Canada
in World Affairs, 513. Margaret Schwartz's book contains a summary of Gallup
poll information on Canadian-American relations. Unfortunately, its utility is
limited because, for the most part, it lists only the percentage of those who
answered positively. However, according to a 1963 poll, 44 per cent saw Canadian
dependency on the United States as "not a good thing." Similarly, a 1958 poll
indicated that only 30% of Canadians thought that " ...American policies were not
costing her the friendship of her allies." See Schwartz, Public qpinion, 65-73.
41 According to John Holmes: " ••. the foreign policy of Canada must be so
designed as to bolster Canadian nationalism and in so doing bolster Canadian
independence. Otherwise we perish or at least dwindle." John Holmes,
"Nationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy," in Peter Russell, ed., Nationalism in
Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1966), 214. See also Minifie,
Peacemaker, 13.
42 Beck, Pendulum, 317. By the early 1960s, pro-Canadianism was a plank in every
major party platform. Max Harrelson, "Canada-US Relations #4: Says Canadians
Leaning Closer to Neutralism." in ottawa Journal, (February 16, 1961); "The
Shopping Basket Election," Toronto Telegram, (June 9, 1962); Lester B. Pearson,
Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, vol. 2: 1948-1957
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 25; Martin, A Very Public Life,
369.
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deciding their posture on Cuba. On Tuesday October 23, the day after
Kennedy's televised address, the Fredericton Gleaner criticized the
United States' position, stating bluntly that ~ ... the day is past for
unilateral action.,,43 The Ottawa Citizen, too, found fault with American
unilateralism, pointing out that ~ .•. it may create great strains among
the Western allies -- who were not consulted, but who share the risk of
war. ,,44 On Wednesday, the Toronto Telegram quoted the British
government's view that ~because... the United States acted unilaterally
without consulting it allies, ... neither Britain nor other NATO members
have any commitment, militarily or otherwise, if the situation leads to
war.,,45 Likewise, the Globe & Mail suggested on Thursday that
" •.. Canada, Bri tain and the other Western allies can and should make
their displeasure felt in Washington at the President's failure to
consul t them in advance of imposing the quarantine. ,,46 The Winnipeg
Tribune pointedly observed that the American position " •.. pulled the rug
from under all pretense about Canada and the United States being joint
partners in continental defence.,,47
In the aftermath of the crisis, the Ottawa Ci tizen defended the
Diefenbaker government's refusal to immediately accede to US demands for
support, stating: "It is not that we want to obstruct the Americans. It
is simply that we must be given time to make a considered decision in
light of our own convictions and interests. ,,48 The Vancouver Sun was
less restrained:
43 "Brinkmanship," Fredericton Gleaner, (October 23, 1962).
44 "The Blockade of Cuba," Ottawa Citizen, (October 23, 1962).
45 "Don't Count on Us: Mac," Toronto Telegram, (October 24, 1962); "Britain
swinging firmly behind Kennedy's Cuban move," ottawa Citizen, (October 27,
1962).
46 "The Crisis Continues," Globe & Mail, (October 25, 1962).
47 "Three Day Stutter," Winnipeg Tribune, (October 26,1962). Eleven days later,
the Tribune wrote " ... there were Canadian voices raised, particularly in the
Liberal Party press, urging that Canada should shout 'ready, aye, ready.' But as
declared by others consistent with Canadian philosophy, 'Canada has not
relinquished British Colonialism to replace it with American.'"
48 "A Lesson from the Crisis," Ottawa Citizen, (November 7, 1962). Charles
Lynch, writing for the Ottawa Citizen, observed that " ... Prime Minister
Diefenbaker demonstrated ... that he is no push-button leader. He may also have
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Generally, the critics take the line that the government took too
long to make up its mind to cry, 'ready, aye, ready!' when
Washington declared an emergency and called on this country, as a
partner in NORAD, to leap to the alert .•.Maybe the critics have
managed to convince themselves that Canada is already the 51st
state and should act accordingly. Mr. Diefenbaker and his
ministers are not convinced of that yet. In this they represent
the thinking of most of us, regardless of party.49
Consistent with the press reaction, an examination of the speeches
made by Canadian politicians during the crisis reveals an acute
awareness of the implications of the crisis for the issue of Canadian
sovereignty. Of all the parties, the New Democratic Party (NDP) was the
most forthright in its criticism of the United States' disregard for its
alliance partners. Following Kennedy's broadcast, NDP House leader H.W.
Herridge told the House of Commons that ~ ..• the members of [his] group
[were] interested to know if the Canadian government was consulted or
informed before this momentous statement was made and this policy laid
down. ,,50 The next day, Herridge pressed Howard Green for a response,
asking once again: "Was the government of Canada consul ted or informed
prior to President Kennedy's statement?,,51 At that point, the Prime
Minister stepped into the fray, replying tersely that " •.. the government
of Canada was informed."s2 Two days later, following Diefenbaker's
speech in support of the American quarantine measures, Herridge had this
to offer:
Some people still cling to the fetish that Canadians must never
rock the boat of United States foreign policy... It would seem to
me .•. that the government of our friendly and powerful neighbor
decided on its course of action without consulting it nearest
neighbor, Canada, or its NATO allies, but merely informed them of
the action decided upon. I emphasize -- and no one can properly
contradict me -- that this is a flagrant violation of the terms of
the North Atlantic Treaty. The President of the United States has
ignored the consultative machinery of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Its members were not asked for their opinion or
advice; they were simply and baldly told what the United States
demonstrated, as the other Canadian Prime Ministers have before him, that he
can't be pushed around. H Charles Lynch, "Statesmanship (or was it
sluggishness?),H ottawa Citizen, (October 27, 1962).
49 "Mr. Diefenbaker's Responsibility," Vancouver Sun, (January 3, 1963).
50 Canada, House of Commons Debates (cited hereinafter as Debates), 22 October,
1962, 807.
51 Debates, 23 October, 1962, 821.
52 Ibid.
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intended to do, and to that course of action in the present world
situation we take the strongest exception. 53
If the NDP was outspoken in its criticism of the United States,
Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition, too, demonstrated an appreciation of the
symbolic importance to Canada of independently determining its course in
external affairs. While at no time did the Liberals overtly make an
issue out of the lack of consultation by the Kennedy government, they
did wait until Wednesday evening before offering an endorsement of the
American quarantine of Cuba. In announcing his party's support for the
us position, Pearson made it clear that he was articulating an
independent Canadian approach, motivated by Canadian interests and
values. 54 Satellitism was unacceptable to him and to the Liberals.
The Social Credi t Party, too, was aware of burgeoning Canadian
nationalism. When on Thursday it announced its support for the United
States' stance on Cuba, it was quite careful to frame its position
within the context of independent choice. Robert Thompson's speech was
most illustrative:
We as Canadians have respect for our own sovereignty, and we
support the united States as our friends and best neighbours. We
do not do so as a vassal state or as a weak neighbour. We do it
because we are Canadians, citizens of the sovereign state of
Canada. Let us stand together on our policy as Canadians,
remembering that we do not have to bend ourselves to all the whims
of those who are much more powerful than we are. 55
The Progressive Conservatives, like their opposition in the House
of Commons, were mindful, too, of the issue of Canadian sovereignty in
their policy pronouncements. While it was careful not to criticize the
motives behind Kennedy's unilateralism, the Diefenbaker government did
53 Debates, 23 October, 1962, 916-917.
54 Pearson said that Canada should offer the United states ~ .•. all the support
that is possible as well as the constructive and considered counsel that can
mean so much from a friend but has no value from a satellite." In ~Pearson Urges
Canada Back US," Globe & Mail, (October 25, 1962).
55 Debates, 25 October, 1962, 915.
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underscore the fact that it was not consulted by Washington. 56 Following
the crisis, the Prime Minister stressed that
in light of this recent experience, it should be made clear that
consultation is a prerequisite to joint and contemporaneous action
being taken, for it could never have been intended that either of
the nations would automatically follow whatever stand the other
might take. 57
His government's policy during the crisis, it was implied, was a result
of an independent consideration of the circumstances of the crisis, in
light of Canadian goals and values. 58
2.1b CANADIAN NATIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
In discussing the rise of Canadian nationalism and the quest for
independence in the late fifties and early sixties, it is impossible to
avoid consideration of the importance of the United Nations for Canada's
foreign policy at that time. Scholar Tom Keating, in his excellent
examination of the multilateralist tradition in Canada, points out that
the United Nations fulfills a number of critical functions for a middle
power like Canada. First and foremost, the UN is a vehicle for
international peace and security. Those goals, worthy in and of
themselves from a Canadian standpoint,59 happen also to be beneficial in
a more instrumental sense Canada is best able to prosper in an
"orderly and predictable world environment. ,,60
Second, the United Nations is a forum through which Canada, in
conjunction with other like-minded middle and small powers, may hope to
56 Transcript of CBC interview of Howard Green on Wednesday, October 24, 1962.,
11. Diefenbaker Canada Centre Archives (DCCA), MG01/XII/C/120 Cuba; Debates, 23
October, 1962, 821, 853; Debates, October 25, 1962, 911.
57 Transcript of speech to Zionist Dinner in Toronto, November 5, 1962, 4. DCCA,
MG01/XXI/vol. 91.
58 In his October 24 interview with DePoe and Lynch, Green defended the
Conservative government's handling of events, stating that " ...Canada has taken
an attitude in a Canadian way.H Green Interview, 8.
59 After all, the principles girding the British North America Act are ~Peace,
Order, and Good Government."
60 Leroy Bennett, as cited in Keating, Canada and World Order, 16. This is both
a function of Canada's dependence on trade and of its relatively insignificant
military capability. See ibid., 17.
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exert some influence on the great powers of the world. 61 More
specifically, the UN offers Canada an opportunity to influence the
foreign policy of the United States. 62 Lester Pearson, one of the main
architects of Canada's post-war internationalist policy, wrote that
involvement in the UN \\ ••• helped us to escape the dangers of a too
exclusively continental relationship with our neighbour without
forfeiting the political and economic advantages of that inevitable and
vitally important association."63
Third, participation in the United Nations serves to develop and
reinforce the positive dimensions of Canadian nationalism. 64 According
to John Holmes, the UN has
... provided a stage on which Canada could emerge from the shadow
of the great powers, •.. [and allows it to] establish an
unmistakable identity. It has given Canada the chance to prove
itself, to gain a reputation in the world. In the past decade it
has offered also a congenial military role which has given the
country a sense of purpose for its armed forces not so readily
fel t for the more subordinate role of lesser military allies --
important and essential though that role may be. Pride in the
mediatory role has given a certain style to Canadian diplomacy.
The reputation for objectivity is sought. Comment on world events
is muted, and emphasis is placed on maintaining contact even with
international malefactors.€-
It was this third function that the UN had come to serve
increasingly by the late 1950s and early 19605. Propelled by burgeoning
nationalist sentiment, the Canadian public was concerned about Canada's
status and influence in the international community.66 The ever-popular
United Nations had come to be viewed as the proper locale for Canadian
statesmen to pursue foreign policy. 67 Unquestionably, Canada was still
61 John Holmes, "The United Nations in Perspective," Behind the Headlines XLIV,
no. 1 (October 1986), 13; Keating, Canada and World Order, 17, 102. This
influence is arguably much greater than would be the case if Canada were
pressing its case alone.
62 Keating, Canada and World Order, 19-20, 47.
63 Pearson, Mike II, 32. Pearson was commenting on Canadian multilateralism, of
which participation in the United Nations was a major part.
64 Holmes, "Nationalism," 208; Keating, Canada and World Order, 112.
65 Holmes, "Nationalism," 208.
66 Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence," in John T. Saywell, ed.,
Canadian Annual Review, 1962 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 103;
Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 4-5.
67 John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your qpinion: Leaders' and Voters'
Attitudes on Defence and Disarmament (Clarkson: Canadian Peace Research
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viewed by both the world and its own people as the ~helpful fixer" in
the international arena, and there was considerable pressure ~ ... on
Canada's UN team to produce victories, to step into the world arena clad
only in a Maple Leaf, and slay a few major dragons."68
The appropriateness of using the United Nations for a successful
resolution to the Cuban crisis was manifest in both press commentary and
in Parliament. The media reaction to Diefenbaker's proposal for a UN
inspection team was, for the most part, positive. 69 The Ottawa Citizen
called Diefenbaker's idea " ... a useful suggestion. "70 The Winnipeg
Tribune wrote that " ... any device that purchases time for emotions to
cool makes sense. If we are to survive ... , human intelligence and not
force must make it possible. "71 The Globe & Mail was most supportive,
suggesting that
Prime Minister Diefenbaker deserves the fullest credit for his
statesmanlike attitude when he spoke in the Commons immediately
after the President's broadcast. He was quick off the mark with
the only constructive suggestion to emerge in the hour of crisis
by proposing that the representatives of the eight neutral nations
on the UN Disarmament Commission should be asked to investigate
the existence of missile bases in Cuba. This suggestion might have
had more weight if it had been put to the Security Council before
the United States took action, but it still deserves to be
pressed, even if the only result is to show the neutral world t~at
the Soviet Union and Cuba will allow no impartial investigation.,2
When it became evident that the neutral inspection team was a non-
starter,73 the press still looked to the United Nations for a resolution
of the crisis. 74 UN Secretary-General U Thant's proposal for a two week
Institute, 1964), 58; Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 5; Bruce Thordarson,
~Posture and Policy: Leadership in Canada's External Affairs," International
Journal XXXI, no. 4 (Autumn 1976), 672-673.
68 Stanley Westall, as cited in Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 7.
69 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 130-131; Reford, Canada, 183.
70 ~The Commons United," Ottawa Ci tizen, (October 24, 1962). The Ci tizen wrote:
"for the first time in the present Parliament, the House stood united. There
was .•• a unanimous desire to find some way of being helpful."
71 ~Sensible Suggestion," Winnipeg Tribune, (October 23, 1962).
72 ~Canada and the Crisis," Globe & Mail, (October 24, 1962).
73 "Canada Preparing UN Resolution," ottawa Citizen, (October 24, 1962). Castro
categorically refused to allow foreign observers on Cuban territory. Moreover,
~either Cuba nor the Soviet Union denied the American charges.
,4 ~The hope of the world right now would appear to rest in the United Nations."
The Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, as cited in ~Canada's Press Views US Move," Globe &
Mail, (October 25, 1962).
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stand-still was met with widespread support. An editorial in the Toronto
Star wrote: "There is hope today that the United Nations has again
demonstrated its value as an agency for cooling off international
conflicts before they reach the point of explosion."75 As it turned out,
Thant's suggestion was never realized, and the crisis was quickly
resolved by negotiations between Khrushchev and Kennedy.
On Parliament Hill, the United Nations figured very prominently in
the dialogue on the crisis. Following Kennedy's "sombre and challenging"
speech, Diefenbaker affirmed at once that " •.. the United Nations should
be charged at the earliest possible moment with this serious problem."76
His ill-fated proposal for a neutral UN inspection team was well
received by Pearson, in particular, who commented: "I think it is
important, as the Prime Minister has indicated, that these international
organizations should be used for the purpose of verifying what is going
on. "77 Furthermore, the three opposition parties immediately expressed
their relief that the United Nations was being involved in resolving the
dispute, and voiced their concern that Canada work actively in support
of the international organization in this time of trouble. 78 This view
would consistently be articulated throughout the crisis.
Of all the parties in the House of Commons, the NDP was the most
fervent in its support for a UN solution. On Wednesday, which happened
to be United Nations' Day, NDP member David Lewis put forward a proposal
for Canada to table at the United Nations. He asked if the government
would consider placing
.•. a resolution requesting that both the USSR and the United
States to act immediately and simultaneously to turn back Soviet
ships from Cuba and to remove the shipping blockade by the United
states, in order to create opportunity for the United Nations to
initiate necessary negotiations to remove the threat to peace?79
75 ~A Reasonable UN Proposal," Toronto Star, (October 25, 1962).
76 Debates, 22 October, 1962, 806.
77 Ibid., 806-807. In fairness, with the exception of Diefenbaker, Harkness and
Green, no other Canadian politicians had, at that time, seen the photographic
evidence of missile sites in Cuba.
78 Debates, 22 October, 1962, 806-807; Debates, 24 October, 1962, 882.
79 Debates, 24 October, 1962, 882.
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The next day, following Diefenbaker's announcement of support for
the US quarantine, H.W. Herridge reiterated the NDP proposition, adding
that ~ ..• it might be necessary to have some ships from other countries
police the shipping lanes to make certain that the two big powers
carried out their undertakings."8o Canada, it was implied, could be one
such country. Pearson, too, opined that Canada might play a prominent
role in such a naval inspection force. 81
Ultimately, nothing came of the NDP suggestions, or for that
matter, Thant's similar proposal for a stand-still. 82 In the irrunediate
aftermath of the crisis, however, Herridge criticized the Diefenbaker
government for having lost a " ... golden opportunity to give leadership
to the smaller nations. ,,83 That same day, though, Howard Green was in
New York, making it known that Canada was ready to contribute ~ ... to
whatever inspection and verification arrangement the United Nations
[might] undertake,,84
While the NDP was most ardent in its advocacy of a strong UN role
in resolving the crisis, it was certainly not alone. The House of
Corrunons was united in supporting the efforts of the world organization
to secure a solution to the conflict. 85 With the exception of Social
Credit, every party advanced proposals for UN resolutions which would
serve to diffuse the crisis. 86 Moreover, in the aftermath of the crisis,
every party went out of its way to express its gratitude to the United
80 Debates, 25 October, 1962, 917.
81 Ibid., 914-915.
82 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 141.
63 Debates, 29 October, 1962, 1006.
84 Ibid., 1003.
85 Debates, 22-29 October, 1962, passim.
86 The Social Credit Party did call for Canada to exercise leadership " ... other
than that which [was) being given by the two great opposing forces in this world
conflict." Debates, 25 October, 915-916. The proposals for ON resolutions are
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Nations. 87 In short, the Parliamentary reaction was well within Canada's
post-war tradition of the ~helpful fixer."
2.2 ALLIED SOLIDARITY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM
Looking back at the events of October 1962, historian J.L.
Granatstein observes that ~no one doubted Canada's response in time of
war. The question [had been] what Canada would do in the immediate
crisis. "88 Certainly, that was the crux of the matter how would
Canada react to Kennedy's unilateral imposition of a quarantine around
Cuba? If the October crisis engaged emerging Canadian nationalism and
the Canadian will to exercise an independent voice in international
relations, it also sparked the desire among Canadians to stand firm with
the United States in the fight against Communist aggression.
Canada, it must be remembered, was rooted firmly in the Western
bloc -- militarily, economically, and socially. In the late 1950s and
early 1960s, there was no disputing that the vast majority of Canadians
and their leaders were strongly anti-communist. 89 Diefenbaker, in
particular, attempted to foster the image that he was an implacable
champion of western democracy fighting valiantly against the communist
menace. 90 At the same time, notwithstanding the rise of nationalist
sentiment in Canada, ~ ... nobody was burning Uncle Sam in effigy."91 Most
Canadians felt considerable affinity for their neighbours to the south.
67 Debates, 29 October, 1003-1006.
88 Granatstein, "When Push Came to Shove," 96; "Allies Support the United
States," Windsor Star, (October 24, 1962).
89 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 535; Bothwell, Canada and the United States:
The Politics of Partnership (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 67.
Leading into the 1962 elections, both the Liberals and Conservatives played up
their anti-communist credentials. In particular, the Liberals attacked
Diefenbaker's trade with Communist states. "Besmirching Canada's Name," The
Globe & Mail, (February 19, 1962). In turn, the Conservatives decried the
Liberals for being 'soft of communism.' J.T. Saywell, Canadian Annual Review
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 9, 21.
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(May 5, 1962), 62; Kevin Gloin, "Canada-US Relations in the Diefenbaker Era:
Another Look," in Story and Shepard, eds., The Diefenbaker Legacy, 4.
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So, while they were often anxious about the United States, neutrality
was not an option. 92
An examination of the press commentary reveals that the issue of
allied solidarity figured very prominently during the crisis. The day
after President Kennedy's televised address, several newspapers printed
articles demanding that Canada stand firm with the United states against
Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Winnipeg Tribune asserted that " .•• there
can be no doubt as to Canada's alignment -- we haven't any choice. ,,93
The Windsor Star wrote that " ... Canadians should be behind John F.
Kennedy all the way. ,,94 As the week progressed, more and more papers
took this position. The Calgary Herald asserted that " ..• Canada's duty
in the current crisis over Cuba is to give unqualified support to the
United States.,,95 Similarly, the Vancouver Province was critical of any
equivocation in backing the Americans. 96 The Globe & Mail offered this
warning:
Any attempt to sit on the fence in this period of crisis, to
remain uncommitted, would be interpreted around the world as a
rebuke to the United states and as aid and comfort for her
enemies. Such a course is unthinkable. 97
Prime Minister Diefenbaker's eventual declaration of solidarity
with the US was met with universal support, but it did not dampen the
ground swell of criticism damning his government's seeming hesitation. 98
However, the Progressive Conservatives were not the only party to draw
92 Schwartz, Public qpinion, 73; ~Time to Quit Whining and Sniping at US,"
Windsor Star, (June 6, 1962); Charles Hanly, ~The Ethics of Independence," in
Stephen Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968), 21. Max Harrelson, ~Canada-US Relations #4:
Says Canadians Leaning Closer to Neutralism," ottawa Journal, (February 16,
1961) .
93 ~US Goes it Alone," Winnipeg Tribune, (October 23, 1962).
94 ~Canada TOo," Windsor Star, (October 23, 1962).
95 ~Canada's Proper Course," Calgary Herald, (October 24, 1962).
96 ~A Nation Without a Voice," Vancouver Province, (October 25, 1962).
97 ~Canada and the Crisis," Globe & Mail, (October 24, 1962). The Globe & Mail
did offer this qualification: ~all that being said, there remain strong grounds
for questioning, not the necessity of what the President has done, but the way
in which he has done it."
98 Media articles concerning the crisis continued well into November. For the
most part, criticism of the Diefenbaker government figured quite prominently.
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media fire for failing to support the United States during the crisis.
On Thursday, October 25, the Vancouver Province reprimanded the Liberals
(and by implication, the other opposition parties) for their failure to
immediately stand firm with the Americans, stating:
And if the government was silent, so was the Liberal opposition,
which had a golden opportunity to speak for the millions of
Canadians .•. , to affirm its principles and intentions, to tell the
world on whose side we stand. 99
A week later, the Winnipeg Free Press offered an even more biting
condemnation:
Certainly, the posture of Parliament in the hours following
President Kennedy's quarantine of Cuba was not only confused but,
to most Canadians humiliating. Neither the government, the Liberal
opposition nor the two splinter parties seemed to realize, or at
any rate none admitted candidly, that here was only one immediate
question for Canada to decide ... Three days passed before the
attitude of government and opposition clarified on the central
issue of the quarantine. By that time an overwhelming majority of
Canadians agr~~d. Their thinking, in fact, was far ahead of the
government's . 10~
Indeed, as the previous press excerpts indicate, Canada's
politicians did not offer any specific endorsement of President
Kennedy's quarantine measures at the outset of the crisis. Following the
President's address, all four parties in the House of Commons offered
comment on the emerging international situation. Prime Minister
Diefenbaker spoke first. Reporting that the missile bases were
undoubtedly offensive in nature, he appealed for calm and ~ .•. for the
banishment of those things that sometimes separate us. ,,101 This was
either an oblique reference to allied solidarity, or a call for non-
partisan uni ty in the House of Commons. Whatever the case, the Prime
Minister did not go further in offering any explicit support for the
President.
99 "A Nation Without a Voice,H Vancouver Province, (October 25, 1962).
100 "Why Canada Failed, H Winnipeg Free Press, (November 1, 1962). Interestingly,
the article went on to offer the following insight: " ... the first Canadian
lesson of Cuba is that there will be no clarity in our foreign policy until a
majority government is elected. H
101 Deba tes, 22 October, 806.
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If Diefenbaker had avoided the issue, the same could also be said
of the other parties in the House. Robert Thompson's speech, in
particular, was a marvel of ambiguity:
We have a moral obligation, not only to our own people but also to
our neighbours and friends in this ideological struggle that
encompasses the world today, and it is our obligation to make our
own stand on these matters clearly understood ... I believe it is
characteristic of Canadians not to panic but thoughtfully and
cautiously to watch the developments that are taking place with
the definite conviction that it is our responsibility to do what
is morally right and to make our actions in that regard known. 102
Unfortunately, Thompson gave no indication of what he thought the
morally correct course of action was. For their part, the Liberals and
NDP did not offer any comment at all on Kennedy's quarantine measures. 103
However, NDP leader Tommy Douglas, having just won his seat in Vancouver
that evening, did suggest to the press that the United states government
was overreacting -- after all, " •.. for fifteen years the Western powers
have been ringing the Soviet Union with missile and air bases."104
The next day, to quell domestic and international criticism, the
Prime Minister offered a clarifying statement to the House of Commons.
He asserted that his suggestion for a UN inspection team was not meant
to " ... [castJ any doubts on the facts of the situation as outlined by
the President of the United States. "105 Rather, it was intended to
supplement the initiatives already undertaken by the Americans.
Diefenbaker also made it abundantly clear that his government was quite
convinced that the Kennedy government had portrayed the Cuba situation
accurately.106
It was not until Wednesday, however, that a Canadian political
party came out in forthright support for Kennedy's quarantine measures.
That evening, Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson issued a brief press
102 Ibid., 807. Thompson did make it clear that he did not believe the crisis to
" ...be a result of the political situation in the United States." However, that
hardly qualifies as offering support for the American position.
103 Ibid., 806-808.
104 "Russia Ringed in for Years," ottawa Citizen, (October 23, 1962).
105 Debates, 23 October, 821.
106 Ibid.
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statement announcing ~ •.. that Canada should give all the support that is
possible to the position taken by the United states in the Cuban
crisis. ,,107
A few hours later, Howard Green was interviewed on the CBC by
Norman DePoe and Charles Lynch. DePoe asked: "Mr. Green, what is
Canada's policy in this crisis? Are we backing the United states all the
way?,,108 To this, the Minister for External Affairs replied:
Canada's always stood by her friends and of course Americans are
our friends and we are standing by them and, mind you, President
Kennedy has had to make a very difficult decision when he was
faced with finding out suddenly that the Soviet Union was
installing offensive missile bases in Cuba. I don't know what
history will say about this action but that action has been taken
now, and I think the important fact is what's done from now on. 109
LYnch raised the issue of the quarantine, inquiring whether the
government endorsed it. Green answered somewhat evasively that ~ ... the
Americans have considered that the action has been necessary and they've
taken it and I think that we must accept that fact. ,,110 DePoe was not
satisfied with that response, and asked if Green supported the
quarantine, or if he merely accepted it. At this point, the Minister
simply replied: "We are friends of the United states and we are standing
beside them."lll Later in the interview, DePoe went back to the heart of
the matter, asking: "Is Canada prepared to back the United States all
the way? What happens if we come right up against World War 111?,,1l2
Green had this to say:
Well, Canada is an ally of the United States and, as I said in
opening, Canada stands with her allies. There's never been any
question of that, and there's no doubt of that today. Mind you,
we're going to do everything we can to get this crisis settled. We
don't want a nuclear war and I don't suppose either of you two
want one either, or any other level-headed Canadian. 113
107 "Pearson Urges Canada Back US," Globe & Mail, (October 25, 1962).
108 Green Interview, 1.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., 2.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 9.
113 Ibid.
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While Green made it clear that the Canadian government was standing by
the United states, he also gave the impression that the government was
doing so more out of a sense of obligation, than out of a ~ ... conviction
that appropriate and legally defensible action was being taken."ll4
On Thursday afternoon, however, Diefenbaker announced in the House
of Commons his unwavering intention to ~ ... support the United states and
[its) other allies in this situation."ll5 More importantly, he offered a
strong endorsement of the American quarantine measures. 116 The Canadian
government, notwithstanding its initial hesitation, was now completely
on-side. Speaking from the opposition benches, Pearson rei terated his
party's solidarity with the United States, adding the qualification that
this did not necessarily mean approval of all the details of the
American action. The Liberal leader emphasi zed ~ ... the necessity of
rallying round our neighbour and our friend as members of the North
Atlantic alliance. nll7 For the Social Credit party, Robert Thompson spoke
once again about of Canada's moral obligations. This time, he was less
ambiguous:
It is only as we stand together with those who hold the same
ideals and cherish the same way of freedom that we have in this
country that we can have any h?fe of standing against the
onslaught of communism in our time.1~
Only the New Democratic Party still refused to endorse the US
position in any way whatsoever. Attacking the brinkmanship of both the
Soviet Union and the United States, Herridge maintained his party's
emphasis on a UN solution to the conflict. Even in the aftermath of the
114 H.B. Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 289.
115 Debates, 25 October, 912.
116 Ibid., 913. The Hansard reports the Prime Minister as saying: "There is a
debate going on throughout the world regarding the legality of the quarantine
measures which the United States has imposed. To my mind such arguments are
largely sterile and irrelevant. We have a situation to face. Legalistic
arguments, whatever they may be, cannot erase the fact that the Soviet Union has
posed a new an immediate threat to the security not only of the United States
but of Canada as well."
117 Ibid., 914.
118 Ibid., 915.
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crisis, the NDP offered neither praise nor support for Kennedy's
actions. 119
Of particular interest, however, was Diefenbaker's speech on
Sunday, October 28, in which he ~rushed to the front of the parade."120
In a brief statement, the Prime Minister announced with evident relief
that the crisis had passed. Somewhat ironically, he went on to assert
that " ... this prospect has resulted from the high degree of unity,
understanding and cooperation among the Western allies. II The Canadian
government, he declared, " ... [had] played its full part."121
2.3 NUCLEAR WAR AND THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL SURVIVAL
In the early 1950s, to offset the Soviet Union's growing
superiori ty in conventional forces, the United states articulated a
strategy of deterrence which emphasized a willingness to take advantage
of its nuclear superiority .122 According to the doctrine of massive
retaliation, the Americans threatened to " ... devastate Soviet and
Chinese economic and political centers in response to any aggression, no
matter how limi ted."123 As the Communists developed their own nuclear
capabilities, US strategy was revised to take account of the new
"balance of terror,"124 and by the early 1960s, the possibility of mutual
assured destruction provided both sides wi th a considerable incentive
for detente. 125 It was hoped that their large nuclear arsenals had
119 Debates, 29 October, 1962, 1005-1006.
120 smith, Rogue Tory, 46l.
121 DCCA, MG01/XII/56/C/120. Statement by the Prime Minister, The Right
Honourable John G. Diefenbaker, P.c., Q.C., M.P., (October 28, 1962). 1.
122 Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in
Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 743n21.
123 Ibid., 740-74l.
124 In August 1956, Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles offered the
following explanation of evolving US nuclear strategy: "Neither side can hope by
a mere margin of superiority in airplanes or other means of delivery of atomic
weapons to escape the catastrophe of such a war. Beyond a certain point, this
prospect is not the result of relative strength of the two opposed forces. It is
the absolute in the hands of each, and in the substantial invulnerability to
interdiction." Ibid., 745n23.
125 The strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was formally articulated by
US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara in 1964. It was put forward to deter the
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rendered direct hostilities between them inconceivable. For if the logic
of deterrence failed, the result would be a catastrophe of unprecedented
magnitude.
In Canada, there was an acute awareness of the dire consequences
of a nuclear confrontation. Indeed, by the time the Cuban missile crisis
thrust itself on the international agenda, the Diefenbaker government
was in the midst of a heated debate on whether it should honour its
commitments to the United States and arm Canada's military forces with
atomic weaponry. 126 It was certainly not an easy issue to resolve, and
would eventually contribute to the demise of
Conservative government.
the Progressive
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, there emerged a public
consciousness in Canada of nuclear weapons and the moral and strategic
dilemmas they posed. More and more, people began to ~ ... think about the
dangers of nuclear war and to question the assumptions undergirding the
policy of deterrence.,,127 Anti-nuclear organizations were formed, giving
voice to the ground swell of concern over the new weapons and the
mili tary strategies they engendered. 128 Groups such as the Voice of
Women, the Canadian Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Canadian
Peace Research Institute argued against a nuclear role for Canada. 129
They were not without support. In 1961, the Committee for the Control of
Radiation Hazards secured the signatures of one hundred and forty-two
thousand citizens in its petition against nuclear arms. 130 Similarly, a
March 1962 poll revealed that 34.4 per cent were absolutely opposed to
Soviet Union from considering a preemptive knock-out strike. Ibid., 757-758.
However, it was implicit in strategic thinking before 1964. See the previous
footnote.
126 See "Survival in the Nuclear Age," Globe eli Mail, (October 23, 1962); "Silence
on Nuclear Arms Question," ottawa Citizen, (October 23, 1962).
127 Simpson, "New Ways of Thinking," 38. See Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of
Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1989),
100; Bothwell, Canada and the United States, 77.
128 English, The Worldly Years, 244; Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 78.
129 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 88-89, 100.
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Canada having nuclear weapons in any circumstances. The same poll also
revealed that a slim maj ority were " •.. against the establishment of
American atomic bomb bases in Canada. ,,131 As for the media, Le Devoir,
the Star, the Globe & Mail, and Macleans's were among the many
publications strongly opposed the acquisition of nuclear warheads. 132
In ottawa, too, most politicians evinced a general aversion to
joining the nuclear club. Leading up to the crisis, all three opposition
parties were firm in their advocacy that Canada maintain its nuclear
virgini ty. 133 Faced with growing public opposition, and unsure of his
support in the House of Commons and in Cabinet, Prime Minister
Diefenbaker temporized on his previous commitment to use atomic weaponry
in defense of North America and Europe. 134 For the time being, he adopted
the position that so long as disarmament was pursued internationally,
Canada would have no nuclear arms in peacetime. 135
Canada's nuclear dilemma would not be resolved until 1963, when
the incoming Liberal government would make arrangements to acquire the
controversial warheads, having earlier in the year reversed its weapons
policy. However, the nuclear debate served to heighten the public's
consciousness of the ramifications of a nuclear war. So, when President
131 Peter Stursberg, "Murky Policy on Nuclear Weapons," Saturday Night, (March
31, 1962). While most people opposed nuclear weapons from a moral standpoint,
there was also opposition to Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons because
Canada could never truly own them. As such, Canada's defense would be subject to
an American veto. See Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 84.
132 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 86-87, 89.
133 Ibid., 114; "Nuclear Arms for Canada Opposed by Three Candidates," Vancouver
Sun, (May 30, 1962); Robert A. Spencer, "External Affairs," 106-107; H. Basil
Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 131, 228.
134 There was a significant split in Cabinet, with Harkness arguing in favour of
Canada fulfilling its defence commitments, and Green arguing passionately
against nuclear weapons, especially in Canada. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs,
105-106; Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 191-192; H. Basil Robinson,
Diefenbaker's World, 204, 207.
135 Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 90, 106; Ghent-Mallet, "Deploying Nuclear
Weapons, 1962-63," in Munton and Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy, 104;
Robert A. Spencer, "External Affairs," 89. Spencer summarized the Diefenbaker
government's nuclear position by saying: "with an election in prospect, and
believing that acquisition of nuclear warheads would win few votes and
undoubtedly lose many, the government moved with a caution that entailed
confusion and ambiguity." See also Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 25-26. "Lose the
Issues -- Win the Election," Saturday Night, vol. 77, no. 3, (June 23, 1962).
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Kennedy made his fateful speech of October 22, 1962, everyone was well
aware of the possible repercussions of a major confrontation between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
In the Canadian press reaction, there was no doubt about the
deeper implications of the crisis. The Winnipeg Tribune observed on
Tuesday October 22, that " .•. both sides seem to be set on a collision
course. I f there is no deviation by one or the other, or both, the
result will inevitably be a nuclear war of major proportions. "136
Similarly, the Kingston Whig-Standard, wrote that the crisis represented
the " ..•most serious threat of world war since the fateful days of the
summer of 1939."137 Parallel sentiments were echoed in 'Canada's
national newspaper,' the Globe & Mail. 138 More to the point, however, was
the Woodstock Sentinel-Review, which asserted that if the Soviets failed
to heed Kennedy's ultimatum, Canada " ... would inevitably be a no-man's
land of a global artillery duel. ,,139 The Ot tawa Ci tizen offered this
conclusion: "Certainly it is unthinkable that an intercontinental
nuclear duel should be allowed to develop out of Moscow's misguided
effort to sustain the sordid dictatorship of Fidel Castro."140
Canada's political leaders, too, were cognizant of the gravity of
the Cuban situation. Following Kennedy's broadcast, Diefenbaker appealed
for calm, stating his government's duty " •.. not to fan the flames of
fear, but to do [its] part to bring about relief from the tensions, the
great tensions of the hour.,,141 Similarly, Pearson emphasized the need to
136 "Canada's Press Views US Move," Globe & Mail, (October 24, 1962).
137 "Newspaper Editorial Opinion Split on Cuba Blockade," Ottawa Citizen,
(October 24, 1962).
138 "Canada and the Crisis," Globe & Mail, (October 24, 1962). The Toronto star,
too, had " ..• the gravest misgivings over the wisdom of President Kennedy's ..• "
quarantine measures. It wrote that "the peril of nuclear war has never been so
acute." See "Kennedy Plays with Fire," Toronto star, (October 23, 1962).
139 "Canada's Press Views US Move," Globe & Mail, (October 24, 1962).
140 "The Conunons united," Ottawa Citizen, (October 23, 1962).
141 Debates, 22 October, 1962, 806. Diefenbaker continued: "Canada knows the
meaning of war. Canadians want peace, as do all free men in all parts of the
world. My prayer this evening is that those who have the responsibility of
statesmanship will always have in mind the need for doing everything that can be
done to assure peace."
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prevent the shock of the President's announcement from " ... resulting in
either a feeling of despair and helplessness on the one hand or panic on
the other. ,,142 The Liberal leader then offered the support of his party
in helping Canada take the necessary steps " ... to prevent [the Cuban]
situation from deteriorating into the indescribable horror of nuclear
war. ,,143
As the crisis deepened, the Social Credit party and the NDP would
also demonstrate a keen awareness of the risks involved in a nuclear
exchange. On Wednesday, October 24, H.W. Herridge demanded Diefenbaker's
assurance that " .•. the Canadian government is doing everything possible
to halt this race toward international suicide."144 For his part, Robert
Thompson cautioned his colleagues that "as we try to solve our
problems ... let us remember we are doing so on behalf of millions of
people whose lives mean as much to them as do ours to US."145
Perhaps the most revealing statement made in Parliament during the
crisis, however, was the passionate outburst by Conservative backbencher
Terry Nugent. Interrupting a debate on the economy, Nugent expressed his
dismay at Kennedy's actions, questioning not only his motives, but also
their legality.146 The Edmonton-Strathcona M.P. was particularly
apprehensive about the US quarantine measures, suggesting that they
might " .•. constitute an act of war." Concluding his emotional appeal to
the House of Commons, Nugent said:
... l suggest that it is the duty of our government to bring this
salient feature to the attention of President Kennedy, to ask him
to stay his hand, to not precipitate a fight. I am afraid that the
other side will not back down in the face of unprovoked aggression
-- and where it stops, no one knows. 147
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 807.
144 Debates, 24 October, 1962, 885.
145 Debates, 25 October, 1962, 916. Pearson was concerned that the Cuban crisis
~ ... could easily explode, resulting in dislocation and catastrophe not only for
the western world but for the world as a whole." Debates, 29 October, 1962,
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While Nugent's statements drew widespread applause, including from
the Liberals and the NDP, and caused a stir in the media, 148 they were
never officially endorsed by the Diefenbaker government. Nonetheless,
they did demonstrate the very real fear of nuclear war that gripped all
of Canada's parliamentarians during the crisis.
Indeed, every major party in Canada used the international
predicament as an opportunity to champion the cause of peace and nuclear
disarmament. Speaking for the government, Diefenbaker expressed the hope
that " ... some good come out of the present dangerous situation." He then
affirmed that the dismantling of the bases in Cuba " ... would represent a
first practical step on the road to disarmament. "149 A.B. Paterson
pursued a similar tack, offering Social Credit's unequivocal support for
Green's efforts in Geneva and elsewhere .150 Likewise, the Liberals and
the NDP reiterated their advocacy of a ban on atomic weaponry. Pearson
and Herridge also used the crisis as an opportunity to reaffirm their
opposition to Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads. Pearson proposed
that all non-nuclear countries agree to a self-denying ordinance in the
Uni ted Nations to stop the dangerous expansion of the nuclear club. 151
Herridge went even further:
It is abundantly clear that the security of Cuba has been
seriously harmed by the installation of nuclear bases, and that
the threat to peace has been immensely increased. This is
precisely the result which the New Democratic party has foreseen
[and] would inevitably follow the spread of nuclear weapons [to
Canada} .152
The Cuban crisis did not resolve the nuclear dilemma in Canada.
Rather, it served to crystallize opinion even further. Opponents of the
bomb were terrified by the near brush with disaster, and redoubled their
efforts to stop the spread, if not elimination, of atomic weapons. By
148 "Tory MP Strongly criticizes Blockade of Cuba," ottawa Citizen, (October 24,
1962); "29 Telegrams Back PC's Blast at US," Toronto Telegram, (October 25,
1962); "Indiscreet and Silly," Edmonton Journal, (October 25, 1962).
149 Debates, 25 October, 1962, 913.
150 Debates, 29 October, 1962, 1005.
151 Debates, 25 October, 1962, 913.
152 Ibid., 917.
65
the same token, proponents of a strategic deterrent were outraged by the
apparent impotency of Canada's defences153 during the crisis, and were
now even more determined that the Diefenbaker government acquire the
necessary nuclear warheads for its armaments -- and soon. 154
153 It was soon evident to the general public that "Canada's Bomarc missiles had
stood unarmed throughout the period of continental alert, and ..• Canada's Voodoo
interceptors had lacked the nuclear weaponry which their American counterparts
possessed." Ghent-Mallet, "Deploying," 101. Haydon speculates, however, that
there may actually have been nuclear weapons in Canada. "Under the political
climate prevailing in the autumn of 1962, that situation would have been a time
bomb." Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 198.
154 There was a debate as to whether it was necessary for Canada to use nuclear
warheads in its defences. There were no conventional warheads for the Bomarc
'B', which Canada had purchased, but conceivably these could have been
developed. It was generally accepted, however, that Canada's weaponry would be
more effective if nuclear equipped. The question was whether such effectiveness
was worth Canada joining the nuclear club. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 81-86;
Don Munton, "Going Fission: Tales and Truths About Canada's Nuclear Weapons,"
International Journal LI, no. 3 (Summer 1996), 514-517.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ROLE, APPROPRIATENESS, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Having characterized the nature and circumstances of the
Diefenbaker government in Autumn 1962, and having explored the momentous
socio-political issues brought to a head in Canada by the Cuban crisis,
this thesis will now examine the events of October 22-25 from a
theoretical perspective that highlights the societal impact on the
decision-making process. Specifically, discussion will centre on how
considerations of role and appropriateness acted to constrain and compel
Prime Minister Diefenbaker and his Cabinet colleagues in their response
to the crisis. The argument is premised on the notion that, when
embroiled in the calculus of policy-making, politicians are influenced
not only by an awareness of their role as leaders of society, but also
by the important issues and expectations engaged by a particular
decision. As pointed out in chapter one, they " ... need to communicate to
their observers that the decisions they make are legitimate."l In short,
they need to establish that their choices "accomplish appropriate
objectives" and are "made in appropriate ways."2
1. THE INITIAL HESITATION: OCTOBER 22-25
As a Member of Parliament, John Diefenbaker was always very
mindful of his obligations to his constituents. As Prime Minister, he
was acutely conscious of his duty to safeguard and promote the welfare
of all Canadians. 3 Moreover, in a nuclear age, he was painfully aware
that decisions he undertook in the name of Canada could have the
1 James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational
Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989), 49.
2 Ibid.
3 Interviews with H. Basil Robinson on 9, 14 August, 1995; Interview with John
Hilliker 9 August, 1995; Erika Simpson, "New Ways of Thinking About Nuclear
Weapons and Canada's Defence Policy," in Donald C. story and R. Bruce Shepard,
eds., The Diefenbaker Legacy: Politics, Law, and Society Since 1957 (Regina:
Canadian Plains Research Center, 1998), 45; H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's
World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1989), 312.
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possible repercussion of deciding the fate of millions. 4 Most certainly
this burden of responsibility weighed heavily on him when, on October
22, he was presented by the Americans with a request for political and
military support for their quarantine measures. Commenting on the
dilemma facing his administration, Diefenbaker would later write:
It was up to the Canadian government to decide where its first
responsibili ties lay. Certainly, we wanted the Soviet missiles
removed from Cuba; but not, if there was an alternative, at the
price of global destruction. 5
In deciding whether to back the United states, Diefenbaker had to
be sure that this was the best possible course for Canada to take.
Unfortunately, he and many others in Cabinet had doubts about the wisdom
and the necessity of Kennedy's quarantine measures. A number of
questions needed to be answered before his government could, in good
conscience, endorse the American position and go to alert. 6
In the early 1960s, many Canadians were anxious about the United
States' preoccupation with CUba. 7 With Fidel Castro's Havana Declaration
of September 2, 1960, the tiny Caribbean island had become a national
obsession in the US. 8 It even surpassed the Soviet Union and communist
China as the primary target of American Cold War rhetoric. As such, Cuba
figured very prominently in the political sparring between the
Republicans and Democrats -- especially in the weeks leading up to the
4 Simpson, "New Ways of Thinking," 45.
5 John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G.
Diefenbaker -- The Tumultuous Years 1962-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada,
1977), 88.
6 Robert Thompson, leader of the Social Credit party, defended Diefenbaker's
seeming hesitation, stating that the Prime Minister had "no alternative but to
delay three days his policy statements on the crisis." "The Prime Minister," he
said, "first had to ascertain whether there was a political motivation for the
us blockade, and whether the us was justified in taking unilateral action." See
"Gov't Blockade Stand Splits NDP, SC Heads: Thompson Supports Diefenbaker,"
Calgary Herald, (October 29, 1962).
7 Peyton Lyon, Canada in World Affairs: 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1968), 32, 514-515; Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, "Canada, the United States,
and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Pacific Historical Review, no. 18 (May 1979),
162.
8 In the declaration, President Castro removed all doubts about his country's
alignment with the Soviet Union. See Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,
"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York:
w.w. Norton & Company, 1997), 58-59.
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crisis. 9 Spurred on by the approaching Congressional elections, American
politicians were increasingly strident in their denunciations of Castro
and his regime .10 President Kennedy, in particular, faced considerable
political pressure to "do something about Cuba,,,11 having been labeled
by Republicans Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater as weak and
indecisive. 12
Not surprisingly, when the crisis broke on October 22, there was
widespread speculation that the President was "playing politics" by
taking a hard line against Castro. 13 The Montreal Star exemplified this
reaction when it wondered " ... about what course would have evolved had
the Congressional elections been out of the way instead of two weeks in
the future.,,14 In Ottawa, Liberal MP J .A. Byrne pressed Diefenbaker to
respond to " ... the suggestion ... that President Kennedy's momentous
decision ...was motivated by domestic poli tical considerations."15
Al though the Prime Minister declined to comment publicly on Kennedy's
motives, they were the subject of considerable discussion in Cabinet. 16
I f there was anxiety over Kennedy's purposes in imposing the
quarantine, there was also concern about the legality of the United
States' position. First, as Conservative backbencher Terry Nugent
9 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 283.
10 "War Whoops on the Potomac," Toronto Star, (September 7, 1962).
11 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 284.
12 "US Warhawks in Full Cry," Ottawa Citizen, (October 10, 1962); Ghent-Mallet
and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba," in Don Munton and
John Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough:
Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992) 81.
13 Ghent-Mallet and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 85; Green interview, 13; C.
King, "Britain Swinging Firmly Behind Kennedy's Cuban Move," Ottawa Citizen,
(October 27, 1962), 17.
14 "Sequence of Action Weakens US Case," Montreal Star, (October 24, 1962); the
Fredericton Gleaner as cited in "Canada's Press Views US Move," Globe & Mail,
(October 24, 1962).
15 Debates, 23 October, 1962, 822. On Monday evening, the Social Credit Party
distanced itself from those in the press who were questioning Kennedy's motives.
Debates, 22 October, 1962, 806.
16 Public Archives of Canada (PAC), RG2/Vol. 6192, Record of Cabinet Decisions
(hereafter Cabinet Conclusions) for 23 October, 1962, 1, 5; Cabinet Conclusions,
24 October, 1962, 7. Green would not comment publicly on the influence of
American elections either. See DCCA, MG01/XII/C/120 Cuba, Transcript of CBC
interview of Howard Green on Wednesday, October 24, 1962, 13. Diefenbaker, for
his part, feared that Kennedy was grandstanding. Diefenbaker, One Canada III,
79-82.
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observed in his impassioned speech to the House of Commons, there was
the question of national sovereignty:
Cuba is an independent sovereign nation ..• and those of us who
believe in the rights of sovereign states, as subscribed to in the
United Nations charter, must concede that big or small, friendly
or unfriendly, whether we like it or not, that country has the
same rights we have. Cuba has the right to arm itself with
whatever arms it can get. Cuba has the right to make any alliance
that it wishes for its own defence, no matter how much we may
dislike, disapprove or even fear that alliance. 17
Second, as the Toronto Star reminded its readers, Cuba had not
committed an act of aggression against the United States. IS While there
was no doubt that Khrushchev and Castro had acted provocatively, there
was some debate as to whether the missiles in Cuba were intended to play
an offensive role. After all, the basis of a nuclear deterrent is
offensive capacity. The Uni ted States, in protecting Turkey and West
Germany from Soviet aggression, was itself ~ ... guilty of using foreign
countries as bases for missiles aimed at the Soviet Union."19 Trade and
Commerce Minister Gordon Churchill, describing the feeling in Cabinet,
would later assert that " ... there was some dispute or some nervousness
naturally about the whole situation. Was there adequate evidence that
the Russians really intended to make a missile attack on the Uni ted
States?"20 Indeed, on the morning of October 24, Prime Minister
Diefenbaker expressed his personal misgivings to his colleagues in
Cabinet, stating:
Some years ago, when the USSR had complained about the
establishment of US bases ringing the Soviet territory, the US had
responded that they had been invited to establish these bases by
the countries concerned. The U.S.S.R could now use a similar
argument to justify the establishment of bases in Cuba ... [I have]
discussed the situation with the U.K. High Commissioner, who had
17 Debates, 23 October, 1962, 852-853.
18 ~Kennedy Plays with Fire," Toronto Star, (October 23, 1962).
19 The Kingston Whig-Standard as cited in "Newspaper Editorial Opinion Split on
Cuba Blockade," Ottawa Citizen, (October 24, 1962), 21. The Peterborough
Examiner followed the same tack. See "Canada's Press Views US Move," Globe &
Mail, (October 25, 1962). See also ~Cuba and US Politics," Globe & Mail,
(September 12, 1962).
20 Peter Stursberg, Diefenbaker: Leadership Lost 1962-1967 (Toronto: university
of Toronto Press, 1976), 16. In Cabinet, Diefenbaker said: "Of course, there
were those who said that the US was doing wrong; among these had been Mr. T.C.
Douglas." Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 2.
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pointed out that it was difficult to classify weapons strictly as
offensive or defensive. 21
Compounding the dilemma facing the Canadian government was the
quarantine itself. Blockades have traditionally been considered acts of
aggression, if not war. Kennedy's quarantine, however, was something new
altogether -- a selective blockade of sorts. While it very definitely
involved search and seizure on the High Seas, such interference was
limited to stopping the inflow of offensive weapons into Cuba. Moreover,
the movement of non-strategic materials would not be hindered, nor would
ships carrying contraband be seized or sequestered -- they would simply
be turned back. Not surprisingly, there was considerable confusion about
the legal implications of the quarantine. 22 For many, even a selective
blockade was sufficiently aggressive to be worrisome. The Ottawa Citizen
attacked the quarantine for its violation of the freedom of the seas,
calling it " ... a mild form of preventive war.,,23 Terry Nugent, too,
expressed the concern that Kennedy's blockade would constitute an act of
aggression. 24 Crucially, nobody really knew with any certainty what was
the legal status of the quarantine, or how the Soviet Union would react
to it -- including the Diefenbaker government. 25
Given the serious doubts that Diefenbaker and many of his
Ministers had about the necessity and legality of Kennedy's quarantine
measures, their hesitation to commit Canada to a course of action fully
endorsing the American posi tion is understandable -- especially when
examining how they perceived the gravity of the crisis.
21 Cabinet Conclusions, 24 october, 1962, 2.
22 Green Interview, 1-2.
23 "The Blockade of Cuba," Ottawa Citizen, (October 23, 1962). See "Montrealers
Picket US Consulate," ottawa Citizen, (October 23, 1962).
24 Debates, 24 October, 1962, 853.
25 DCCA, MG01/XII/C/120, vol. 56. Howard C. Green, Memorandum for the Prime
Minister: United States Quarantine Against Cuba, (October 23, 1962). Diefenbaker
asked Green to prepare a brief on the legality of Kennedy's selective blockade.
On page five it concluded: "The quarantine decreed by President Kennedy would
seem to be a sui generis. In consequence, while it would not be correct to
assert categorically the legality of the United States move, it is impossible as
well to conclude that it is illegal."
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In his analysis of the events of October 1962, Peter Haydon writes
that " ... it looked as if the severity of the crisis had escaped Canadian
politicians. u26 It would be more accurate to say that Canadian leaders,
as a group, initially viewed the crisis with less alarm than the general
public, and only later grew to have deep concerns. Indeed, following
Kennedy's speech, Prime Minister Diefenbaker and significant number of
his Ministers did not appear to see any imminent and overriding threat
to Canadian security.27 Thus, they did not think it urgent to mobilize
the military and rush in -- especially when doing so could, in their
eyes, destabilize the entire situation. 28
Of course, the Canadian government felt obliged to take a few
precautionary measures to ensure Canadian security. On Tuesday, Cabinet
decided to deny Russia overflight permission for its planes, and ordered
that Cuban, Czechoslovakian and other Soviet bloc aircraft bound for
Cuba be searched for contraband material. Authorization, too, was given
to improve the readiness of Army Headquarters and warning centres, as
well as other key government departments. 29 Similarly, on Wednesday,
October 24, Cabinet delayed the scheduled rotation of Canadian forces in
Europe. 30
However, beyond this, a significant number *31 of Cabinet members
did not see the immediate necessity of increasing the level of military
26 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 136.
27 Recalling his bad-tempered telephone conversation with Kennedy, Diefenbaker
asserts that he told the President that Canadian forces " •.. would be ready if a
real crisis developed, but that [he] did not believe that Mr. Khruschev would
allow things to reach that stage." Diefenbaker, One Canada III, 82. See also
Pierre Sevigny, This Game of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and stewart, 1965),
253. There were Ministers, such as Harkness, who perceived a distinct threat to
Canada. At least initially, they did not dominate Cabinet. Haydon, The 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, 128.
28 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 194. Haydon himself concludes that
" •.. there was no reason at the start of the crisis to put Canada's defence
forces on a warfighting alert." See Cabinet Conclusions, 24 october, 1962, 7.
29 Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 3, 7.
30 Cabinet Conclusions, 24 October, 1962, 5-6.
*31 Ghent-Mallet and Munton suggest that a slim majority may have initially
agreed with Diefenbaker's view of the crisis. Ghent-Mallet and Munton,
"Confronting Kennedy," 87-88. Peter Newman's account implies this as well. Peter
Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart Ltd., 1963), 337. Knowlton Nash concurs with Newman and Ghent-Mallet,
vigilance for Canada's NORAD forces
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after all, the Americans had
themselves not yet gone to full alert. 32 While Diefenbaker and Green
were convinced of the existence of nuclear bases in Cuba,33 they may not
have viewed them as representing a significant change in the nuclear
threat facing Canada. 34 At any rate, it was argued in Cabinet that the
government should wait and see how other countries reacted to the United
states' position, before committing to a particular course of action.
Some Ministers suggested that
a decision to act or move into a more advanced stage of alertness
could be put into effect so quickly that waiting a while would
have no serious consequence. After all, the US had taken ten days
to be sure they were right in their decision; surely 24 hours
delay would not be unreasonable for Canada. 35
If the Canadian government did not perceive an imminent threat to
national security, it was well aware that the diplomatic situation hung
in the balance, and could, if mismanaged, easily lead to a war of
nightmarish proportions. The fear of aggravating the situation was very
much a consideration for Diefenbaker in particular, and given the weight
citing Waldo Monteith as saying " ... a majority of cabinet swung over to backing
Diefenbaker." Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing across
the Undefended Border (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 194. However,
Patrick Nicholson asserts that "a majority favoured ordering (Canadian] forces
to be alerted to DefCon 3." Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Don Mills:
Longman's Canada Ltd., 1968), 160. Similarly, Robert Reford suggests that a
majority in Cabinet favoured an alert. Robert Reford, Canada and Three Crises
(Ontario: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1968), 180. This thesis,
in the absence of conclusive information, argues that it was possible that
Diefenbaker's position enjoyed the support of the majority of Cabinet -- at
least on Tuesday. After all, even Sevigny had some doubts about the necessity of
an alert. The Associate Minister of Defence would later comment: "up to a point
[Diefenbaker) was right. After all, I mean, why mobilize everybody? ... Some
people really exaggerated the importance of this thing, and then the press
picked it up and the criticism started." Pierre Sevigny, as cited in Stursberg,
Diefenbaker, 15.
32 Peyton Lyon cites an unnamed Cabinet source as suggesting that the government
"declined to accept Mr. Harkness's demand for an immediate alert because [it)
knew that the Americans had not yet placed their forces on the maximum alert."
Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 37.
33 Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 1.
34 Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 196; Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 38; Green
Interview, 2.
35 Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 5.
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of responsibility which he felt for the lives of individual Canadians,
his caution was quite " ... natural and understandable."36
In Cabinet, the Prime Minister expressed his concern that going to
alert would not only cause unnecessary panic, but could destabilize the
precarious international situation as well. 37 He and Green admonished
against blindly following the United states, stating that "quick action
brought quick judgement, and [that] it would be dangerous to have the
present moves interpreted as offensive rather than defensive action."38
Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable to worry that the
Soviets would be alarmed by rapid Canadian mobilization. 39 At the same
time, it was argued in Cabinet that if Canada did not immediately follow
the American lead, it might serve to calm Kennedy down a bit, and allow
a greater chance for diplomacy to resolve the crisis. 40 If cool thinking
did not prevail, Diefenbaker warned, the result would be nuclear war and
nobody in Canada wanted that -- especially "Canadian mothers."41
One cannot forget that the overriding obligation of the Canadian
government was to act in such a way that would best ensure the nation's
security. There were numerous considerations which served to emphasize
the need for caution, and which led to the initial Canadian hesitation
to endorse the American quarantine and go to alert. However, insofar as
36 Reford, Canada, 205. See Thomas Hockin, ed., Apex of Power: The Prime
Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall
Canada Ltd., 1977), 249.
37 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 124, 192; Cabinet Conclusions, 23
October, 1962, 5.
38 Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 5.
39 Diefenbaker was not alone among Western leaders in worrying about
provocation. French President Charles DeGaulle, Harold Macmillan, and Supreme
Allied Commander Lauris Norstad were all against an overt military alert. "As a
result, European forces did not go on a higher state of alert. H Haydon, The 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, 195. Macmillan, in particular, thought an alert would be
provocative. Ghent, "Canada, the united States,H 171. Notably, Haydon suggests
that Green and others in Cabinet may have erroneously associated an alert with
the automatic release of nuclear weapons to advance positions in Canada. Haydon,
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 125-127. Undoubtedly, this would have heightened
their fears about how provocative an alert would be.
40 Diefenbaker and others in Cabinet saw Kennedy as the biggest threat to world
peace. Simpson, "New Ways of Thinking,H 38-42; Diefenbaker, One Canada III, 80.
See also Stursberg, Diefenbaker 199.
41 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 159.
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the Diefenbaker government did not perceive an imminent and overriding
threat to Canada, decision-making during the crisis was also influenced
by other priorities.
Prime Minister Diefenbaker was extremely sensitive to the domestic
political ramifications of foreign policy decisions. At the same time,
too, he was visibly concerned with maintaining his administration's
legi timacy in the eyes of the public -- approval was most definitely
important. As a consequence, considerations of appearance and
appropriateness were never far from the political decision-making
process.
During Cabinet deliberation of the risks of moving the Canadian
component of NORAD to the equivalent of DefCon 3, there was some anxiety
over the ~ ... domestic political overtones in the US decision." It was
argued that ~ .•. Canada should appear to be behaving normally and
deliberately. ,,42 Without all the details of the actual conversation, 43
one can only speculate as to what was meant, but it seems that Cabinet
considered it important that the public perceive the government to be
acting rationally and responsibly, carefully weighing the pros and cons
of the situation before acting. Given the political context of Kennedy's
decision, and the repercussions of a misstep, it would not have been
appropriate for Canada to rush in without first ascertaining ~ ...whether
there was a political motivation for the US blockade, and whether the US
was justified in taking unilateral action,,44
In the same discussion, the issue of Kennedy's disregard for the
consultative provisions in NORAD was also raised. 45 Many Ministers,
including Diefenbaker and Green, were quite indignant that the United
42 Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 5.
43 Cabinet conclusions are only general summaries of discussion, and are framed
in such a way that the respective positions of individual ministers are not
often identifiable.
44 Robert Thompson as cited in "Gov't Blockade Stand Splits NDP, SC Heads:
Thompson Supports Diefenbaker," Calgary Herald, (October 29, 1962).
45 Newman, Renegade, 334; Ghent, "Canada, the United States," 176.
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States government did not consult Canada before embarking on a course of
international adventurism. 46 For this reason alone, some argued, Canada
ought not back the Americans. 47 In debating whether Canada should follow
Kennedy's lead, the point was made that the NORAD agreement
... provided for [an] independent decision to be made by the
government with respect to the degree of participation by their
personnel. In this instance, Canada should not appear to be
stampeded. 48
Undoubtedly, the government expected the general public to be as
outraged by American indifference for Canadian sovereignty as it was. 49
Aware of rising Canadian nationalism, and of support for previous pro-
Canadian foreign policy positions, Diefenbaker probably anticipated
" ...widespread support for independent action"SO in the crisis.
Certainly, this was a compelling consideration in delaying Canadian
endorsement for Kennedy's quarantine measures. Moreover, having in
previous years donned the mantle of vocal champion of Canadian
sovereignty, the Prime Minister was in many ways trapped -- if he did
not defend Canada's right to independent action in foreign affairs, he
and his minority government would be subject to charges of satellitism
and weakness from the other political parties in Canada. 51 So, when
faced wi th a fai t accompli, Diefenbaker found it very di fficul t to
immediately back the American position.
At the same time, the growing nuclear debate complicated decision-
making in the crisis even further. Paul Martin, who served in Liberal
Cabinets before and after the Diefenbaker interlude, suggests that
Diefenbaker withheld political and military support for the Americans
because of the growing anti-nuclear movement in Canada. 52 While
46 Ghent-Mallet and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 88.
47 Newman, Renegade, 334; Lyon, Canada in World Affairs, 37.
48 Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 4.
49 Ghent-Mallet and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 88.
50 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 143. See also ibid., 116; Ghent-Mallet
and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy," 88.
51 Reford, Canada, 206.
52 Paul Martin in Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 18.
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obviously an oversimplification, there may be an element of truth to
Martin's admittedly partisan analysis. There is no doubt that leading up
to the crisis the Prime Minister was qui te impressed by the force of
anti-nuclear sentiment in Canada. 53 After all, it led him to temporize
on his commitment to arm Canadian Bomarcs and Voodoos with atomic
warheads. Thus, it is plausible to suggest, as does Haydon, that
Diefenbaker was loath to go to alert unless absolutely necessary because
doing so " ...would expose the full extent of civil defence and military
deficiencies."54 Given the polarization of opinion on the nuclear issue,
and his government's minority position in the House of Commons, the last
thing the Prime Minister wanted was to bring on a situation that would
force his hand. He was well aware that if he articulated a policy either
rej ecting or embracing nuclear weapons, he risked alienating a large
segment of the Canadian population, not to mention several members of
his Cabinet. 55
In summary, Diefenbaker's hesitation to go to alert and to back
the Americans was influenced by a number of priori ties. First and
foremost was the responsibility to ensure the safety of Canada and
Canadians. Initially, his government was convinced of neither the
necessity nor the wisdom of supporting Kennedy's measures. There were
doubts about the President's motives in imposing a quarantine, as well
as the legality of the American position. Whether Canada should alert
the NORAD component of its military was not immediately self-evident
either. Many Ministers did not perceive an imminent and overriding
53 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 204, 207; Reford, Canada, 167;
Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 207.
54 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 193. Prior to the announcement of an
alert, Liberal Defence critic Paul Hellyer was asking in the House of Commons
whether Canada had armed its Bomarc squadrons with nuclear warheads. Debates, 24
October, 1962, 885. Haydon speculates that there may already have been nuclear
arms in Canada at the time of the crisis. This, if discovered, would have been a
political nightmare for the government. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,
195-198.
55 Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 26. See also H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World,
204.
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threat to Canadian security, and, further, there were compelling
arguments that mobilization would actually be detrimental to a peaceful
resolution to the crisis.
Also contributing to the government's initial hesitation were
considerations of appropriateness. Given Diefenbaker's leadership style,
and his government's precarious position in the House of Commons, public
support was most definitely a concern. Cabinet was of the opinion that
the government had to be perceived by the Canadians as acting
responsibly and deliberately during the crisis. Moreover, Diefenbaker
and Green expected the Canadian electorate to applaud an independent
approach to the crisis, especially in light of Kennedy's failure to
consult Canada before embarking on his risky gambit. At the same time,
too, it is likely that Diefenbaker did not want to take any action that
would complicate his already difficult balancing act with regard to the
acquisition of nuclear warheads.
2. DIEFENBAKER'S UN INSPECTION TEAM PROPOSAL OF MONDAY, OCTOBER 22
If considerations of role and appropriateness were important
factors contributing to the Canadian government's hesitation to follow
the American lead in the crisis, they also figured prominently in
Diefenbaker's proposal for an independent UN inspection team to verify
activi ty in Cuba. As reported to Washington by Livingston Merchant,
Diefenbaker did not intend to remark publicly on the crisis until
Tuesday afternoon. 56 Thus, when Lester Pearson telephoned him
immediately after Kennedy's speech, asking that he comment on the
international situation in the House of Commons that evening,
Diefenbaker was caught unprepared. Yet he could not refuse Pearson's
request. As a consequence, the Prime Minister went to Parliament without
having had the opportunity to contemplate the merits and implications of
56 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 286.
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the only advice on the crisis he had yet received -- a memorandum from
External Affairs. 57
The memorandum, which Diefenbaker read following his briefing with
Merchant, asserted that it could " ... confidently be assumed that some
international endeavour will be made to avert war and bring about a
negotiated settlement." Making reference to how the UN was able to
contribute the resolution of the Suez crisis, it went on to raise the
question as to " ••• whether there is again a role for Canada to play."s8
Specifically, the memorandum suggested that
the only action which could be taken in a United Nations context
which might avert measures which could lead to conflict, would be
move in the Security Council to have a group of 'neutral' nations
-- perhaps the 8 non-aligned members of the Eighteen Nations
Disarmament Committee -- conduct an on-site investigation in Cuba
of the USA Government's charge that that country has permitted the
installation on its terri tory of offensive nuclear missiles. If
vetoed in the Security Councilor otherwise rejected by the Soviet
Union and Cuba, the issue could be taken to the floor of the
Assembly where an overwhelming vote in favour of such a proposal
could be expected. Even if such a move failed to result in the
admission of an investigation team to Cuba, it would at least have
the virtue of confirming and exposing the aggressive designs which
the USA maintains the Soviet Union has on North America. 59
In view of the possible gravity of the crisis, and of his personal
doubts about Kennedy and the legality of the quarantine measures, the
Prime Minister probably thought the proposal for an inspection team was
" ... the wisest and safest course for the time being. ,,60 After all, he
realized, it would impose a break in the escalating tension, and would
serve to " .•. prevent any rash and hasty decision by the United
States. ,,61
Furthermore, because of Canada's reputation as a "helpful fixer,"
the Prime Minister was under significant political pressure to do
57 The memorandum was intended for circumstances different from what actually
evolved. Unfortunately, Diefenbaker did not have any other proposals, or any
time to seek out other advice. Howard C. Green, "Memorandum for: The Prime
Minister," 22 October, 1962, DeCA, MG01/XII/88/D/204.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. Undersecretary of State for External Affairs Norman Robertson was the
architect of this proposal.
60 Ghent, "Canada, the United States," 167.
61 Diefenbaker, One Canada III, 79. See also Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 189;
Reford, Canada, 178-179.
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something constructive to diffuse the crisis. He was well aware that the
United Nations was the only arena in which his government could
realistically hope to secure an independent and prominent role in the
resolution of the conflict62 a role Canadians expected it to play.
And, as the memo from External Affairs implied, here was a golden
opportunity for him to prove his mettle as a world leader. Most
certainly, he did not want to pass up this rare chance " ... to dispel
once and for all the belief that Pearson was still the greater Canadian
statesman. ,,63
3. HESITATION NO MORE: GOING TO ALERT AND BACKING THE UNITED STATES
If initial considerations of role and appropriateness led the
Diefenbaker government to hesitate to follow the American lead, the same
considerations were also instrumental in later decisions to alert
Canada's military and to offer unequivocal support to Kennedy's
quarantine measures. From the outset of the crisis, Douglas Harkness was
firm in his conviction that Canada should support the United States in
confronting the Soviets over the missile bases in Cuba. Compared with
Diefenbaker and Green, the Defense Minister articulated " ... a very
different view of the severity of the international situation,"64
believing not only that Canada was under direct and imminent threat, but
also that national security would be best served by precautionary
military mobilization. 65 Notwithstanding Kennedy's failure to consult
the Canadian government, the former lieutenant-colonel also believed
that Canada had a moral obligation to alert its forces in concert with
62 Reford, Canada, 178. Moreover, United Nations Day was fast approaching,
reinforcing the important symbolic status that the world organization held in
Canada. Undoubtedly, this symbolism was not lost on Diefenbaker.
63 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 123. See also H. Basil Robinson,
Diefenbaker's World, 287; Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John
Diefenbaker (Toronto: Macfarlane and Ross, 1995), 455; Haydon, The 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis, 122-123.
64 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 128.
65 Cabinet Conclusions, 24 October, 1962, 6. See Simpson, "New Ways of
Thinking," 35.
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its American ally. 66 As discussed earlier, much of Cabinet did not
initially subscribe to Harkness' position. Consequently the government
decided to watch events develop further before committing Canada to a
particular course of action.
However, by Wednesday morning, with the implementation of the
American quarantine measures, three-quarters of Cabinet was in favour of
bringing the Royal Canadian Air Force to an alert equivalent to DefCon
3. 67 Describing the situation, Public Works Minister Davie Fulton would
later say: "We had reason to resent the lack of consultation, but it
would have been foolish not to temper it with an understanding of the
situation. "68 Nevertheless, Diefenbaker and Green in particular,
remained strongly opposed to an alert, still fearing that it would alarm
the Soviets. 69 At this point, Diefenbaker told Cabinet about a telephone
conversation he just had with Macmillan, in which the British Prime
Minister supposedly " •.. urged that there be no additional provocative
act because ... [the crisis] was completely in balance and that war might
come immediately, and anything that anything that upset the balance was
unwise."70 With that, the non-alert faction prevailed once again. 71
However, that afternoon Harkness was informed that the Strategic
Air Conunand and some of the US Navy and had moved to DefCon 2
"imminent enemy attack expected." The Defence Minister immediately
approached Diefenbaker with this new information, stating forcefully
that an alert could no longer be postponed. "With the American alert
66 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 124: Lyon, Canada in World Affairs,
II: Cabinet Conclusions, 23 October, 1962, 4.
n Ghent, "Canada, the United states," 176.
68 Ibid.
69 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 166.
70 R.A. Bell, as cited in Stursberg, Diefenbaker, 16. The Cabinet Conclusions
read: "Fortunately, the United Kingdom was emphasizing the need for restraint."
Cabinet Conclusions, 24 October, 1962, 7. See Ghent-Mallet and Munton,
"Confronting Kennedy," 88: Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 165.
71 Nicholson implies that Diefenbaker, using Macmillan's phone call urging non-
provocation, was able to win over a majority in Cabinet. Nicholson, Vision and
Indecision, 166. Other accounts suggest that Diefenbaker simply overruled his
colleagues. Ghent, "Canada, the United states," 177: Reford, Canada, 185:
Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 132.
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increased and actual hostilities apparently so imminent, the question of
nonprovocation seemed less important ..• ,,72 to the Prime Minister, who
told Harkness, with grudging resignation, to ~go ahead."
Diefenbaker's decision, however, only resulted in a change in
Canada's official position. The day before, believing that he had no
choice, the Defence Minister had gone to the Chiefs of Staff without
Cabinet's knowledge and ordered steps be taken in secret to effect a de
facto mobilization of the Canadian military. 73 Interestingly, it was
Harkness' sense of duty and obligation to Canada and its allies that led
him to defy the authority of the Prime Minister. So, in the final
analysis, both he and Diefenbaker were motivated by the same weight of
personal responsibility. Where they differed was in their perception of
the threat facing Canada, and of how best to deal with it.
In the House of Commons that afternoon, the government did not
apparently deem it wise or necessary to announce that it had ordered
Canadian NORAD forces to go to alert. 74 It was quite evasive in
answering questions from the opposition. In response to a query by Paul
Hellyer concerning the state of Canadian military preparedness, Harkness
offered only that Cabinet had ~ ... taken certain precautionary measures
which will have the effect of improving the capability of the armed
forces to respond to any situation that may exist. ,,75 When pressed on
the nature of such measures, the Minister of Defence replied: "I do not
think, Mr. Speaker, it would serve the public interest or that it would
be a good thing at this time to follow the course of action suggested by
72 Ghent, "Canada, the United states," 177.
73 Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 128. H. Basil Robinson suggests,
however, that Diefenbaker "had a pretty good idea of what was going on and
preferred to let it happen in a less than formal way. Not much escaped the
Diefenbaker antennae." H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 288.
74 According to Lyon, when the Prime Minister gave Harkness permission to alert
Canada's NORAD forces, he " ... insisted ..• that there be no announcement until he
could make one in the House the following afternoon." Lyon, Canada in World
Affairs, 45.
75 Debates, 24 October, 1962, 884.
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the hon. member."76 Diefenbaker, too, refrained from answering questions
concerning steps taken to improve defence readiness:
Mr. Speaker, I think this answer will apply to various questions
that I know occur to hon. gentlemen at this time and which they
have refrained from asking. I think that in these hours and days
of international sensitivity all of us will endeavour to exercise
a restraint in asking questions which under normal circumstances
would be appropriate but which at this time might be considered as
provocative and fear-producing. 77
By all indications, the government was still being careful to
avoid both provoking the Soviet Union, and unduly alarming the Canadian
public. Most notably, it had yet to give any sign of whether it
supported Kennedy's measures. Diefenbaker and Green still believed that
a pro-Canadian, independent stance was the most appropriate position for
their government to take. Certainly, in the interview with DePoe and
Lynch later that evening, Green made no effort to offer forthright
endorsement of the quarantine measures. For his part, the Prime Minister
was qui te happy with Green's performance, phoning to congratulate him
after the interview. 78 Circumstances were changing, however, and would
soon force the government to rethink its position on the American
action.
As one Canadian official has since put it: ~ ... the real lesson [of
the crisis] was that when the US President chooses to psychologically
mobilize the American people ... the Canadian people will be drawn up in
the process also."7 9 Indeed, President Kennedy's televised address did
reach Canadians, and it had a most profound effect on their perceptions
of the situation. 88 Undeniably, the President's speech served to instill
the fear that Canada was under imminent and direct threat from the
missiles in Cuba, and that the West was at that very moment confronted
with the preliminary stages of Soviet aggression. Thus, for many
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Reford, Canada, 194.
79 As quoted in J.L. Granatstein, and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse:
Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd.,
1991), 206.
80 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 294.
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Canadians, including much of the press, it was unthinkable that their
government was not standing firm with its ally in such a time of
uncertainty. On November 8, the national vice-president of the
Progressive Conservative party, George Hogan, would give voice to their
complaint:
There is a time to stand up to the Americans, and there is a time
to stand by them; and I suggest that when the security of the
North American Continent is menaced by the threat of nuclear
attack, that is a time to stand by the Americans, clearly,
swiftly, and unequivocally.81
By Thursday, October 25, it was obvious that the government's
refusal to endorse the American quarantine measures was noticeably out
of touch with both Canadian and world opinion. In Britain, Prime
Minister Macmillan had announced his government' s unequivocal support
for the American position, and had wired to Diefenbaker a telegram
" ... emphasizing the need for America to act firmly if confidence in
American support was to be maintained among her allies."82 France, the
night before, had announced its " ... firm support for the American arms
blockade."83 West Germany, too, had earlier endorsed Kennedy's
quarantine without reservations. Thus, among the United states' major
western allies, Canadian support was increasingly conspicuous by its
absence.
At home, Green's performance on the CBC interview with DePoe and
Lynch was widely criticized, in and out of the Conservative party. 84
81 Smith, Rogue Tory, 463. See also "Testing Time," Winnipeg Free Press,
(October 23, 1962). Of course, much of the hue and cry after the crisis was
undeniably partisan. "It seemed clear (particularly now that the crisis was
over, there had been no war, and Premier Khrushchev had backed down) that public
opinion strongly supported President Kennedy's action." John Warnock, Partner to
Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1970),
175.
82 Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1973), 205; Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, 200.
83 "Paris Backs US," Winnipeg Free Press, (October 25, 1962). While France
immediately recognized Kennedy's right to meet the threat to America in whatever
manner he deemed necessary, it did not initially endorse the quarantine
measures. Moreover, because it was not consulted, the French government made it
known that France would not become involved in a localized war between the US
and Cuba. "Lack of Talks Annoy Paris," New York Times, (October 24, 1962).
84 Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, 167; Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, 200-
201.
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Following the broadcast, Prime Minister Diefenbaker received several
telegrams decrying both the interview and his government's apparent
vacillation. 85 On Thursday, the morning press was overwhelmingly in
favour of Kennedy's stance against the Soviets, and offered little
support for independent Canadian action. 86 Topping things off, the
Liberals had come out in public support of President Kennedy and his
quarantine measures. Faced with pressure from Robert Bryce, 87 External
Affairs, and several indignant Cabinet members, Diefenbaker decided
n ••• that there was need to clarify the government's stance for the sake
of understanding in his caucus, among the Canadian public, and in
Washington."ss More specifically, he realized that, given the enormous
public support in Canada for the President's measures, he had to offer
unequivocal endorsement for Kennedy's stance against communist
aggression. 89 With the crisis having progressed to a stage where he
could no longer hope to exert any influence, further delay would bring
no result other than political debacle. Backing the Americans was now
the entirely appropriate course of action.
85 One telegram, from the Drumheller Young Progressive Conservative Association,
read as follows: "Canada has chosen to be one of the few leading nations of the
western world who has failed to take an immediate and strong stand in support of
our American allies on their current and vital Cuban action. Our suggested
neutral inspection mission is an indecisive and impractical proposal which is
unworthy of Canada and is an insult to President Kennedy, the American People,
and the Free World." DCCA, MGOl/VI/8859.2 #425284. Another telegram said:
"After having seen tonight's television appearance of your repeat your foreign
minister with DePoe and Lynch I as a Canadian must protest to the inept and
inaccurate and truly evasive and unCanadian attitude taken by Green. We as
Canadians must take a definite step and back the United States in their action
against the Communists ...• " DCCA, MG01/VI/8859.2 #424836. Deane Finlayson,
leader of the B.C. Progressive Conservative Party, phoned the PMO to register
his dissatisfaction with the government's performance. DCCA MG01/VI/vol. 173.
86 "Canada's Press Views US Move," Globe & Mail, (October 25, 1962).
87 Bryce was the clerk of the Privy Council and the secretary to Cabinet. An
extremely able individual, Bryce won Diefenbaker's confidence, and became one of
the Prime Minister's more trusted advisors. See Smith, Rogue Tory, 249.
88 Smith, Rogue Tory, 461. See also Reford, Canada, 194.
89 Cabinet Conclusions, 25 October, 1962, 16. In Cabinet that morning, the
following points were raised: "It was for consideration whether Canada's
position with respect to the US action was clear to the public. There had been
discussion on television and the Prime Minister had made a statement in the
House, but the public did not appear to be sure whether Canada fully supported
the US action or whether it was neutral. This situation should be corrected •
..• The Cabinet agreed that the Prime Minister should make a statement in the
House later that day outlining what steps Canada had taken already and
clarifying Canada's stand in support of the US action."
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That afternoon, the Prime Minister spoke at length to the House of
Commons. He acknowledged " ... the direct and immediate menace to Canada"
posed by the missiles, and announced his government's intention to
" ..• support the United States and [its] other allies in this
situation."90 Reiterating that he was informed of the crisis only hours
before Kennedy's broadcast, Diefenbaker justified his government's
initial hesitation:
It has been necessary and will always remain necessary to weigh
the risks both of action and inaction in such circumstances. I
need not refer to the record of Canada in two world wars, in the
NATO alliance, and in Korea as demonstrating the fact that
Canadians stand by their allies and their undertakings, and we
intend to do the same. On the other hand, we shall not fail to do
everything possible to seek solutions to these problems without
war. We shall avoid provocatiye action. Our purpose will be to do
everything to reduce tension.9~
He went on to outline the steps which had been taken to ensure
Canadian safety. Before concluding his address, however, Diefenbaker
offered comment on the motives and legality of the American stance:
There is a debate going on throughout the world regarding the
legality of the quarantine measures which the United states has
imposed. To my mind such arguments are largely sterile and
irrelevant. We have a situation to face. Legalistic arguments,
whatever they may be, cannot erase the fact that the soviet Union
has posed a new and immediate threat to the security not only of
the United States but of Canada as well. 92
Moreover, Diefenbaker resolutely condemned Khrushchev's reckless and
provocative attempt to secretly upset the nuclear balance, adding that
" ... we in Canada have shown responsibility in this connection in order
to avoid the proliferation of these dangerous weapons throughout the
world."93 The Canadian government was now on-side.
Looking back at the events of October 22-25, Pierre Sevigny
commented:
it would be unfair to say that John Diefenbaker deliberately acted
in a way to prejudice the cause of world peace .•. But he did
misjudge the seriousness of the situation, and he miscalculated
the absolute determination of his followers to stand side by side
90 Debates, 25 October, 1962, 911-912.
91 Ibid., 912.
92 Ibid., 913.
93 Ibid.
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with their American neighbors in a combined effort to halt
Communist aggression in the many continents of the world. 94
As the former Associate Minister of Defence acknowledged, the
Diefenbaker government certainly did not want to jeopardize the
prospects for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Everyone in Cabinet was
motivated by an overriding personal obligation to safeguard the security
and well-being of the Canadian people. However, there was a serious
split in opinion as to how this responsibility would best be discharged.
Initially, the viewpoint put forward by Diefenbaker and Green prevailed,
and the decision was made to wait and to watch events develop further.
But the general population, as well as many Ministers, perceived a more
imminent threat to national security than did the Prime Minister and his
supporters within Cabinet. Thus, there emerged a significant divergence
of opinion between the government and the public, which advocated
offering immediate and unwavering support to the Americans in defending
" ... the vital interest of the western hemisphere. ,,95 Eventually, faced
with rising international tension stemming from the implementation of
the blockade, and the concomitant increase in American military
vigilance, Diefenbaker could no longer justify a non-alert, and he
acceded to Harkness' demands to mobilize the NORAD component of Canadian
forces. It took the Prime Minister another day to realize, however, that
an independent Canadian stand on the crisis was not a politically viable
posi tion for his government to pursue, and to offer his government's
endorsement of Kennedy's measures.
94 Sevigny, This Game, 253.
95 "Newspaper Editorial Opinion Split on Cuba Blockade," Ottawa Ci tizen,
(October 24, 1962).
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CONCLUSION
In explaining the Canadian response to the October crisis, most
analysts have focused, quite justifiably, on Prime Minister Diefenbaker
and his personal impact on the decision-making process. After all, it
was he who was at the apex of the political hierarchy in Canada,
exercising considerable sway over his Cabinet colleagues. Undeniably,
his predilections were crucial factors in determining how Canada would
react to Kennedy's quarantine measures. Most accounts, too, have focused
on Harkness and Green -- the two other individuals in Cabinet who played
a strong role in policy-making during the crisis. As the respective
Ministers for Defence and External Affairs, their personal views had an
appreciable affect as well on the position adopted by the Canadian
government. Indeed, insofar as they were the key decision-makers, this
thesis does not contest that Diefenbaker, Green, and Harkness, and
others in Cabinet, should figure prominently in any explanation of the
governmental reaction to the crisis. Unfortunately, consistent with the
statist tradition in Canadian foreign policy analysis, insufficient
attention has been given to the socio-political context of the crisis,
resulting in an oversimplified interpretation of the motives driving the
Prime Minister and his colleagues. Important questions have been left
unanswered by the existing literature on Canada's response to the Cuban
crisis: What societal issues were engaged by Kennedy's quarantine
measures? Were Diefenbaker, Harkness and Green just anomalous
individuals acting purely according to personal preferences? To what
extent did their perceptions of these issues buttress or weaken their
individual inclinations towards action? When examining ordinary foreign
policy activity, these questions are significant; when exploring crisis
foreign policy decision-making, they are markedly so.
Using the theoretical perspective put forward by Patrick Stuart
Robinson, this thesis has attempted to answer these questions, and in so
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doing, inject some sense of balance back into the treatment of Canada's
reaction to the Cuban missile crisis. It does not dispute that
Diefenbaker's habit of postponing decisions, and his dislike of
President Kennedy were major contributing factors behind Canadian
hesitation to endorse the American measures. But it does suggest that
important societal issues were engaged by the crisis, and appreciably
affected the decision-making process during the long days of October 22-
25. Specifically, it has shown that Diefenbaker and his Ministers were
motivated primarily by considerations of their personal responsibility
to safeguard and promote national well-being. This was equally the case
in the initial hesitation to go to alert, in Diefenbaker's United
Nations proposal, and in the later decision to mobilize Canada's navy
and NORAD forces. At the same time, this thesis has shown that other
priorities also affected decision-making during the crisis. Most
certainly, Diefenbaker was driven by considerations of appropriateness
when he called for an independent UN inspection team. Similarly, he,
Green, and others in Cabinet were influenced by the rising tide of
Canadian nationalism when they attempted to articulate a pro-Canadian
independent position. Undeniably, too, Diefenbaker's eventual decision
to offer unequivocal endorsement of the American position was a direct
result of the ground swell of support in Canada for Kennedy's quarantine
measures.
Having re-examined the Cuban missile crisis using an analytical
perspective which highlights the socio-poli tical dimension of foreign
policy decision-making, a number of general points warrant comment.
First and foremost, when using a framework such as that put forward by
Robinson, it is necessary to remember that societal influence on the
decision-making process arises out of the perceptions of its key actors.
As Denis Stairs observes, ~ .•. the pressure of constituent opinions - or
at least what are perceived as constituent opinions - will clearly limit
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a policy-maker's practical freedom of maneuver. "1 Without a doubt, the
Diefenbaker government's reaction to the events of October 1962 was
greatly influenced by how it understood the crisis and its relevance to
Canadian society. The eventual decision to support the American
position, for example, was a direct result of changing perceptions of
what the appropriate action was during the crisis by Thursday
morning, Diefenbaker realized that further hesitation would be political
suicide. He had come to find his 'practical freedom of maneuver' to be
quite limited.
Second, societies are not closed environments. Just as the
sovereign state is found only in abstraction, the sovereign society does
not exist outside the realm of the ideal. Like states, societies are
subject to considerable outside influences. Certainly, Canadian society
during the late 1950s and early 1960s was no exception. During the Cuban
crisis, American television, radio, and print permeated Canada, and
contributed, in large part, to the strong public endorsement of
Kennedy's hard line against the communists. Undeniably, Canadians were
profoundly affected by President Kennedy's efforts to mobilize American
sentiment in support for his quarantine measures, and any account of
societal impact on the Cuban missile crisis must necessarily recognize
this fact.
Third, advances in education and communications technology have
increased the significance of considerations of appropriateness in the
foreign policy decision-making process. Not only have Canada's external
relations become more accessible to the general public, they have become
more relevant on a personal level -- Canadians have come to develop a
keen appreciation of how foreign policy affects their daily lives.
Consequently, policy-makers have experienced a growing ~sense of
Denis Stairs, "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the
'Domestication' of Canadian Foreign Policy," International Journal XXXIII, no. 1
(Winter 1977-78), 132.
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confinement H in determining foreign policy.~ At the same time, cognizant
of the rising importance of foreign policy to Canadian society,
politicians have often found it ~ ... profitable to convert this increased
popular attention into political power. H3 Diefenbaker, most certainly,
was one such leader. Any account of foreign policy decision-making
during his tenure as Prime Minister must reflect his acute sensitivity
to the domestic political ramifications of external policy.
In closing, this thesis has served not only to supplement the
existing literature on the Cuban missile crisis, but to illustrate the
significance of society to foreign policy decision-making. Importantly,
this case study has sought to demonstrate that the statist perspective
of external affairs can sometimes contribute to an incomplete
understanding of Canada's external relations. Foreign policy, one must
remember, is best understood as ~the extension abroad of national
politics. H
- Ibid. "The [foreign policy] success of the 1940s and early 1950s, however, lay
equally in the extent to which the general pUblic, which was relatively
uninformed about particular international issues, gave Canadian diplomats broad
parameters in which to operate .... In the 1960s, however, this freedom vanished,
as the model of public opinion formation which policy-makers effectively used in
the golden age proved inadequate as a guide. H Robert Bothwell and John English,
"The View From Inside Out: Canadian Diplomats and Their Public,H International
Journal XXXIX, no. 1 (Winter 1983-84), 65.
3 Franklyn Griffiths, "Opening up the Policy Process,H in Stephen Clarkson, ed.,
An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? (Toronto: McClelland and stewart Ltd.,
1968), 116.
4 The 1970 White Paper on Canadian external relations defined foreign policy as
" ... the extension abroad of national policies. H The Government of Canada,
Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Queen's Publisher for Canada, 1970), 9.
14 Oct.
15 Oct.
16 Oct.
17 Oct.
18 Oct.
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APPENDIX I
CHRONOLOGyl
U2 photographs MRBM sites in western Cuba
RCN/RCAF exercise (OTT4/62) scheduled for 15-24 Oct.
cancelled due to weather, ships remain at sea close to
Halifax.
Kennedy informed of missiles. ExComm is formed.
Khrushchev claims no Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba.
Diefenbaker is asked in House of Commons if Cuba and Berlin
issues have been referred to the UN. He denies the linkage.
28 missile launch pads found in Cuba, many considered to be
operational within a week.
In the House of Commons, Lester Pearson and other opposition
members ask if there will be any change in the position on
nuclear warhead policy. Other defence policy questions
asked.
USN Admirals Taylor and Koch arrive in Halifax for
operational discussions of ~an urgent nature." Pacific fleet
exercise CRABPOT ends but ships kept at sea in local areas
for ASW exercises in response to concern over situation.
USN and USAF begin relocating fighter aircraft. US agencies
shorten warning time to 18 hours.
Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Ambassador Dobrynin.
Members of opposition (Hellyer and Berger) tackle
Diefenbaker in House of Commons on nuclear weapons policy.
Possible Soviet submarine contact detected some 300 miles
(NM) southeast of Halifax, tracked by RCAF Argus and USN P2V
until 20/21 Oct. (Designated B-27)
1 As excerpted from Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis:
Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of
Strategic Studies, 1993), 226-234.
19 Oct.
20 Oct.
21 Oct.
22 Oct.
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Kennedy discusses crisis with JCS who recommend air strike
on Cuba.
Opposition continue to ask questions in House of Commons on
Cuban trade policy. Diefenbaker answers that the policy is
under review ~in light of recent events."
USN P2Vs join hunt for B-27. RCAF P2V from Comox on special
surveillance task in Gulf of Alaska - recovered in Kodiak.
JCS alerts US military commands, worldwide, that crisis is
imminent. US base in Guantanamo reinforced. USN units
(INDEPENDENCE TG and ENTERPRISE) deploy to blockade area.
Decision to blockade Cuba made and announced to government
officials, but media asked to withhold publication of
speculative articles, yet New York Times has many such
articles.
US Ambassadors Acheson and Dowling leave for Europe to brief
NATO and heads of state. Kennedy sends Macmillan a personal
telegram.
CINCLANTFLT issues ~Quarantine Op Order." Soviet motor
vessel ~TEREK" detected in western Atlantic with possible
submarine alongside.
Diefenbaker informed by telephone that Ambassador Livingston
Merchant coming to Ottawa to brief him on crisis.
International Events:
US media speculates on impending crisis, reporting troop and
aircraft movements.
NATO and allied leaders briefed by US ambassadors.
Kennedy speaks to the nation and the world at 1900.
Canada:
Diefenbaker, Harkness (MND) and Green (SSEA) briefed by
Ambassador Livingston Merchant at 1545 after being
officially advised at 1000 that Merchant will be coming.
In the House that afternoon, opposition members ask question
on nuclear overflights and on Canadian use of nuclear
weapons; the answers [are] vague.
Diefenbaker speaks to Parliament at 2000.
22 Oct.
23 Oct.
93
After US forces placed on DEFCON 3 following Kennedy's
speech, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Air Marshall Miller, goes
to Harkness at 1900 to discuss Cdn military responses.
Harkness agrees to initial preparations, but Diefenbaker
declines to put Canadian air force units on similar status.
Military staffs in Ottawa begin reviewing plans. CINCNORAD
requests permission to arm USAF squadrons in Canada with
nuclear weapons, to deploy USAF aircraft to Canadian bases,
and for the RCAF to go to DEFCON 3.
Canadian Atlantic fleet exercises are stopped that evening
and ships return to Halifax to store for war. On west coast,
RCAF P2V on special patrols "OYSTER" and "BARRACUDA" with
two aircraft on task, while ships remain at sea.
International Events:
White House announces Proclamation on blockade to start at
1400 on 24 Oct., for "the interdiction of the delivery of
offensive weapons to Cuba."
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk briefs OAS which then adopts
US resolution condemning Cuba. OAS promises support to US
and approves a resolution calling for the immediate
dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all offensive
missiles and other weapons, recommending individual and
collective action including the use of force, and to inform
the UN which should send observers as soon as possible.
USSR denounces the blockade as an "act of piracy" and an
~unheard-of violation of international law," accuses the
United States of "taking a step towards unleashing a thermo-
nuclear world war" and reaffirms that the Soviet arms
deliveries to Cuba are purely for defensive reasons. Leave
cancelled for Soviet forces. Castro also denounces US
actions.
UN Security Council meets at 1600 in an emergency session to
consider US resolution.
NATO discreetly increases military readiness rather than
mobilizing as request by Washington.
US SECDEF holds press conference to explain concept of
operations. Canadian and other military attaches briefed on
concept of operations.
23 Oct.
24 Oct.
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Canada:
Harkness and Chiefs of Staff meet at 1900 to discuss alert
measures and response. Cabinet meets at 1000 and discusses
Canadian military alert without reaching a conclusion.
Canadian forces not put on formal alert, but several
measures taken to increase national readiness. Harkness
later orders COS to put forces on alert discreetly.
Diefenbaker states in House that the Americans have failed
to consult Canada properly and that his government has
insufficient information upon which to act. He then makes
short amplifying statement without supporting Kennedy.
This draws much criticism including New York Times editorial
comment: ~It is worth noting, however, that neither the
Prime Minister nor the Opposition Leaders said anything
suggesting that Canada cut off her trade with Cuba or join
any possible blockade or military action that might follow."
Submarine ALDERNEY (on loan from RN) sails before first
light for ASW Barrier position. Another possible submarine
contact (designated B-28) detected that afternoon; two RCAF
Argus put on surveillance. Atlantic fleet continues discreet
preparations for emergency operations. Pacific fleet remains
at sea.
International Events:
Blockade of Cuba goes into force at 1000. Twenty-five
communist-bloc ships believed to be bound for Cuba. Also,
three Soviet submarines known to be in North Atlantic and
probably bound for Cuba. US government releases photographs
of missile sites in Cuba. Seventeen USN VP aircraft (P2V)
and 10 USN submarines deployed for ASW barrier south of
Grand Banks.
In the UN, intense ~behind-the-scenes"activity by
~uncommitted" countries to find a compromise. U Thant, in
response to a plea from the seven-member committee
representing those countries, sends identical letters to
Kennedy and Khrushchev suggesting a truce for two or three
weeks for negotiation during which the arms shipments and
the quarantine should be suspended.
24 Oct.
25 Oct.
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In Moscow, Khrushchev replies to message from Bertram
Russell telling him that the Soviets would do everything in
their power to prevent war from breaking out.
Several OAS countries offer military support to the us.
Canada:
Cabinet meets at 1030, but Diefenbaker still does not put
military on alert. Various other measures adopted to
increase preparedness. At 1149 Federal Warning Centre
informs RCAF Ops Centre that SAC went to DEFCON 2 at 1025
that morning. Harkness goes to the PM again after the
Cabinet meeting and alert finally authorized. That
afternoon, PM speaks in House but still does not openly
support US, nor does he advise members of military measures
taken. Howard Green interviewed on TV in controversial
session.
RCN Atlantic Command and Maritime Air Group authorized to
increase state of readiness to equivalent to DEFCON 3. The
Chief of the Air Staff informs CINCNORAD at 1320 that RCAF
would go to DEFCON 3. CINCNORAD places all NORAD regions on
DEFCON 3C at 1334. Military staffs in Ottawa meet throughout
the day to examine military preparations.
Ships out of Canadian areas recalled. Atlantic fleet begins
to prepare for war at 1030. Surveillance of Soviet fishing
vessels and off-shore area increased. Exercise BEAGLE II
cancelled because USN forces withdrawn.
A Czech aircraft lands at Gander at 1817 en route to Cuba
and departs at 2017 after being searched.
Canadian press contains several reports opposing US action,
but most Canadians appear to support the Americans.
International Events:
Kennedy and Khrushchev reply to U Thants's message,
essentially agreeing to open negotiations. Kennedy, however,
establishes the removal of the weapons from Cuba as the key
to finding a solution. The UN Security Council unable to
make progress due to refusal of Soviet Ambassador to be
specific about the weapons shipped to Cuba.
25 Oct.
26 Oct.
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Pentagon briefs Canadian military attaches. Comments made on
lack of Canadian support for US actions. Some Soviet vessels
turn back from blockade zone.
In London, Macmillan gives public support to Kennedy and
sends telegram to Diefenbaker requesting he do likewise.
Canada:
Cabinet Defence Committee briefed by Chiefs of Staff in
morning.
Diefenbaker makes long statement in the House that afternoon
supporting the Americans and giving details of actions taken
by Canada. Green challenged by Paul Martin on his TV
interview, particularly where Green dodges the questions and
further probes and avoids having to admit his own lack of
understanding of the NORAD system. Hellyer asks if the
BOMARCs have been armed and is told that they have not been.
Military headquarters staffs in Ottawa meet to examine
measures to increase readiness and discuss NATO/US requests
for additional support. Operational commands more active.
All Atlantic fleet ships at immediate notice for sea and
ready for immediate operations. One escort groups sails that
evening for surveillance operations in vicinity of possible
Soviet submarine. Pacific fleet task group (2nd Squadron)
diverts to assist USN prosecuting possible Soviet submarine
contact.
Wide coverage of events in Canadian media reporting on
statements by Diefenbaker and Green and on the argument
between Harkness and Hellyer. Globe and Mail editorial
scolds Kennedy for ignoring the consultative machinery of
NATO.
International Events:
The crisis deepens. Kennedy claims Soviets continuing to
establish missile sites and unwilling to stop work or
dismantle them.
USN intercepts first ship.
British continue to express concern over status of UK ships
trading with Cuba.
26 Oct.
27 Oct.
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U Thant sends another message to Khrushchev after
discussions with US and Soviet Ambassadors, and sends second
message to Kennedy. His aim is to prevent a confrontation at
sea that might lead to war. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev
reply immediately. Khrushchev sends separate message to
Kennedy.
Canada:
Only passing mention of crisis made in House.
Atlantic fleet continues to deploy for surveillance
operations and to disperse to secondary ports in case of
surprise attack. Additional ships made ready for operations.
Pacific fleet also remains at sea but at lower level of
activity.
Canadian media contains wide round-up of public opinion on
crisis and repeats criticism in Canada and the United States
of Diefenbaker's tardy response. A Globe and Mail article
links the crisis to the nuclear weapons issue while another
claims that ~Sources outside the House interpreted these
remarks as an indication that Canada does not intend, in
this current crisis, to give Canadian troops at home or
abroad nuclear warheads for their weapons." The Globe and
Mail editorial supports Diefenbaker and agrees that the full
scope of emergency plans should be kept secret in order not
to ~make the threat appear even more serious than it is."
International Events:
Khrushchev sends second letter to Kennedy proposing way of
resolving crisis. Kennedy replies to Khrushchev's first
letter, reaffirming requirement to stop work on the missile
sites as the first step in resolving the crisis. The White
House also claims the Soviets have made several inconsistent
and conflicting proposals while work still continues on the
missile sites.
A U2 surveillance aircraft is shot down over Cuba.
Soviet submarine count in Western Atlantic continues to
rise. US increases requirement for open ocean surveillance.
COMASWFORANT requests Canada take over Quonset ASW area.
Consideration also given to moving ASW barrier north to
Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap.
27 Oct.
28 Oct.
29 Oct.
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Canada:
Canadian military remains on alert, conducting surveillance
and confirming identity of new contacts. RCAF patrol
aircraft assigned to USN ASW barrier.
With the level of tension declining Canadian media begins
closer scrutiny of political and military response to
crisis, partly in context of uncertain Tory defence policy.
International Events:
In a third letter to Kennedy, Khrushchev states he has given
orders for work to stop on the missile sites and for the
dismantling of the missiles. Kennedy accepts proposals. US
suspends blockade but keeps ships on station.
Canada:
Naval and RCAF forces continue surveillance with ships not
at sea remaining in their dispersal areas. RCAF Air Defence
Command remains on alert.
USN establishes SUBAIR barrier across approach routes to
North American waters.
UN attempts to organize verification procedures for removal
of missiles from Cuba. Castro balks, claiming he was not
consulted in the deal made between Kennedy and Khrushchev.
Statements by Diefenbaker and party leaders on end of
crisis. Opposition questioning returns to nuclear weapons.
Military staffs in Ottawa discuss future operational
requirements. Atlantic fleet continues to analyze and
criticize government response to crisis.
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APPENDIX II
THE FIVE PHASES OF CANADIAN MILITARY PREPAREDNESS1
(1) a ~discreet" phase of ~litary Vigilance that increased the
military readiness for operations without causing undue civilian
concern (the Minister [of Defence} normally had authority to
declare this phase without direct reference to cabinet};
(2) a "ready" phase of ~litary Vigilance prepared the forces for
deployment and to intensify security and surveillance operations
(at this stage, public knowledge of an impending crisis was
unavoidable);
(3) a Simple Alert was declared only when there was credible
indication that NATO was about to be attacked or "on the existence
of international tension anywhere in the world on a scale that
might have serious consequences to Canada";
(4) a Reinforced Alert was ordered only when there was "conclusive
indications that the outbreak of hostilities is imminent"; and
(5) a General Alert was declared only when "an act of overt aggression
takes place in the NATO area, or in any area where the
consequences would affect Canada in the same way as an attack on
Canada."
1 Reproduced from Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian
Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of strategic
Studies, 1993), 94-95.
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